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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
I. DisMIssAL

FROM CIVIL SERVICE

In Thurmond v. Steele, I the court dealt with two issues arising
out of the dismissal by the Department of Motor Vehicles of an
employee covered by civil service. The employee had been arrested
for driving while intoxicated. He was driving his personal automobile on personal business at the time of the arrest. Part of the
employee's duties included hearings on license revocations and
administrative decisions with driver's suspension and license revocation.
The first issue the court decided was whether an employee
under civil service could be dismissed for activities outside the
scope of his employment. The Civil Service Commission believed
that an employee under civil service could only be dismissed when
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.2 However, the
court found that if a state employee's activities outside the job
reflect upon his ability to perform the job or impair the efficient
operation of the employing authority, and bear a substantial relationship to the efficient performance of the employee's duties, dis-

'

225 S.E.2d 210 (W. Va. 1976).
Id. at 212.
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ciplinary action can be taken regardless of the outcome of any
criminal charges.' Since the Department of Motor Vehicles had
offered to introduce evidence to show the impairment of his ability
to perform his duties, the case was remanded to the Civil Service
Commission for further proceedings.
Second, the court held that in an employee dismissal case
before the Civil Service Commission, although the burden of proof
is still on the employee to show that his dismissal was improper,
the employing authority must first present evidence justifying its
action.' The court decided this issue because the Civil Service
Commission had indicated that it would require the employee to
go first in the presenting of evidence.5
3 The court in reaching this decision relied on Foster v. Department of Pub.
Welfare, 159 So. 2d 515 (La. App. 1964); and Baron v. Commonwealth, State Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 8 Pa. 6, 301 A.2d 427 (1973).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-6-13 (Cum. Supp. 1976), changes the burden of proof
to the employing authority in all cases before the Civil Service Commission. Before,
the burden of proof in an employee dismissal case was on the employee to show that
he had been wrongfully dismissed. Now, the burden of proof is on the employing
authority to prove that the dismissal was proper.
I The Civil Service Commission was Telying on Childers v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
155 W. Va. 69, 181 S.E.2d 22 (1971). Childers placed the burden of proof on the
employee in a dismissal case. The result of this case was changed by statute. W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 29-6-13 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I. ATTACHMENT

Although the trend in recent years has been to invalidate most
summary prejudgment creditor's remedies as violative of the constitutionally required due process of law, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in Persingerv. Edwin Associates, Inc.,'
upheld the West Virginia attachment statute.' The facts of
Persingerreveal that the plaintiff filed an affidavit with the clerk
of the Kanawha County Circuit Court alleging that he had a claim
against the defendant. The affidavit showed the amount of the
claim, its nature, and the grounds for the claim. The plaintiff
asserted that the defendant was removing its property from the
state and/or converting it into cash in order to avoid service of
process or execution and to defraud its creditors. The defendant,
Edwin Associates, Inc., moved to quash the writ of attachment,
claiming that the affidavit supporting the writ was insufficient,
and contained false assertions and grounds and that the statute
itself was unconstitutional, violating the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. The
Kanawha County Circuit Court held the statute unconstitutional.
On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals first
addressed the question of the sufficiency of the affidavit seeking
the writ of attachment. After examining the requirements of the
statutes regarding the necessity of alleging certain specific statutory grounds of attachment' and the material facts which give rise
to those grounds,9 the court held that the affidavit in question was
indeed sufficient to support a writ of attachment.'0
Turning to the constitutional issue, the court distinguished
230 S.E.2d 460 (W. Va. 1976).
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38-7-1 to -3 (1966).
The grounds . . . are the following: (a) That the defendant .

a foreign corporation

. . .

. . is
or (b) has left or is about to leave the State,

with intent to defraud his creditors; or . . . (d) is removing . . . his
will be
property ...
out of this State, so that process of execution ...
unavailing; or (e) is converting . . . his property . . . into money or

securities, with intent to defraud his creditors.
W. VA. CODE ANN.

§ 38-7-2

(1966).

"[T]he affiant shall also state in his affidavit the material facts relied upon
by him to show the existence of the grounds .... " W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-7-3
(1966).
10 230 S.E.2d at 464.
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the facts and statutes involved in Persingerfrom those involved in
a string of recent United States Supreme Court decisions. This line
of cases had held that certain types of prejudgment remedies (similar to attachment) were unconstitutional if, prior to any deprivation of a significant property right, the debtor was not given some
form of assurance that the deprivation was legitimate as defined
by the due process clause."
The West Virginia court viewed the leading case of Sniadach
v. Family Finance Corp.,12 which held a Wisconsin attachment
statute unconstitutional because it did not provide for pre-seizure
notice and opportunity to be heard, as having an unclear impact."
Fuentes v. Shevin, 4 in which certain replevin statutes were struck
down for lack of compliance with Sniadach in not providing a preseizure hearing, was viewed by the West Virginia court as suggesting that prejudgment remedies would be constitutional if the creditor could establish the validity of his claim through a hearing prior
to seizure. 15 Both decisions were viewed by the court as somewhat
suspect because they were decided by a United States Supreme
Court which had two vacancies."
Two later United States Supreme Court decisions, rendered
by a nine man court, were also used by the West Virginia court in
ruling upon the constitutionality of the statute in question in
Persinger.In Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.,' 7 the Louisiana sequestration statute was upheld, despite constitutional challenges, because the creditor, in order to qualify for the writ, had to assert
material facts entitling him to the relief. The Court in Mitchell
also stressed the fact that a judge had been the presiding officer
at the sequestration proceeding. However, in North GeorgiaFinishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., '1the same Court struck down a Georgia garnishment procedure because the statute fatally lacked re- North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (invalidated the Georgia garnishment procedure); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1971)
(invalidated Pennsylvania and Florida replevin statutes); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1968) (invalidated Wisconsin garnishment procedure).
12 395 U.S. 337 (1968).
230 S.E.2d at 462.
407 U.S. 67 (1971).
230 S.E.2d at 462.
Id.

17416 U.S. 600 (1973).
"

Id. at 616.

419 U.S. 601 (1975).
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quirements for an immediate hearing and judicial participation in
the process.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the statutory attachment scheme because a defendant could obtain an
immediate hearing, including a jury trial upon the question of the
sufficiency of the affidavit, on request.2" The statute was viewed as
holding out special protection for the debtor by its bonding provisions. 2' The failure to have a judge preside over the attachment was
not seen by the court as depriving the defendant of due process:
the clerk as an officer of the court was deemed to have the power
to issue the writ.Y
Although the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals upheld
the constitutionality of West Virginia's attachment procedure, it
is difficult to understand the reasoning behind the decision in light
of the United States Supreme Court decisions.
As previously noted, in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,23
the United States Supreme Court held the Wisconsin garnishment
procedure unconstitutional. The statutory scheme allowed the
clerk of any court of record to issue a summons at the request of
the creditor which garnished one-half of the wages of the debtor.1
This procedure was deemed to violate due process because there
was no provision for a pre-seizure hearing or for notice of any kind
to the debtor that his property was no longer to be in his possession.n Garnishment of a laborer's wages was viewed by the Court
as being potentially disastrous to a family perhaps already struggling with insufficient financial resources. Thus, the Court viewed
not only the statutory procedure as unconstitutional, but also saw
the effects of that procedure as reprehensible. In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan stated what has become the foundation
thesis for the constitutional protection of "the new property": 26 "I
think that due process is afforded only by the kinds of 'notice' and
20 W. VA. CODE ANN.

21 W. VA. CODE ANN.

§§ 38-7-32, -33 (1966).
§ 38-7-8 (1966).

= 230 S.E.2d at 464.
= 395 U.S. 337 (1968).
21

That statute read in part: "When wages ... are the subject of garnishment

action, the garnishee shall pay over to the principal defendant ... a subsistence
allowance, out of the wages . . . then owing ....
" Wis. STAT. § 267.18(2)(a)

(1966).
395 U.S. at 339.
2, See generally, Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
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'hearing' which are aimed at establishing the validity, or at least
the probable validity, of the underlying claim against the alleged
debtor
before he can be deprived of his property or its unrestricted
'2
use."
Three years later in Fuentes v. Shevin,1 the Court dealt with
a constitutional challenge to the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes. Again, the statutes allowed the summary repossession of the debtor's chattels without requiring the creditor to afford
any pre-seizure notice and hearing."9 The procedures sanctioned by
the states were found to violate the requirements of due process in
that those requirements were viewed by the Supreme Court as
including the right to receive notice and defend in a meaningful
manner: "If the right to notice and a hearing is to serve its full
purpose, then, it is clear that it must be granted at a time when
the deprivation can still be prevented."3 Even a temporary nonfinal deprivation was held to be a deprivation of a property right
protected by the fourteenth amendment, because the property interest entitled the debtor to the use and continued possession of
the goods." This basic property right was held not to be limited to
the "necessities of life", which was the argument of the lower court
32 The Court in Fuentes
in an attempt to distinguish Sniadach.
commented in dictum that a summary seizure could be valid for
due process purposes in order to protect some extraordinary governmental function or a vital interest of the public at large.33
The Louisiana sequestration process upheld by the United
States Supreme Court in Mitchell v. W. T. GrantCo.,3" was similar
to those procedures struck down in Fuentes and Sniadach, except
for the fact that a judge presided over the entire proceeding. The
different result in Mitchell can perhaps be attributed to the greater
probability of fairness which the Court perceived in the required
presence of a judge and to the conservative majority's focus upon
the rights of the creditor. The Mitchell Court saw a very real dan395 U.S. at 343 (Harlan, J., concurring).
407 U.S. 67 (1971).
29 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.01, .13 (Supp. 1972-1973); PA.
1821 (1953).
407 U.S. at 81.
3 Id. at 85-86.
2 Id. at 88-90.
3 Id. at 90-91.
416 U.S. 600 (1973).
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ger in pre-seizure notice because it would give the debtor an opportunity to "hide" the goods, and the Court accordingly required a
hearing, not before possession was disturbed, but only before the
final taking of the property.
The principles first enumerated in Fuentes and Sniadach were
reiterated in North Georgia FinishingInc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.35 This
time, it was a Georgia garnishment statute which violated the
requirements of due process. 6 Rather than overruling Mitchell, the
Court distinguished that case as being based upon the special features of the Louisiana statute, including the requirement that a
judge preside over the issuance of the writ. 7
If Mitchell had been decided differently, the West Virginia
attachment statute would clearly be unconstitutional. Fuentes,
Sniadach, and Di-Chem all invalidate statutory schemes virtually
identical to the West Virginia procedure because none of them
offered the debtor his constitutional right to appear and defend
against the claim pressed against him. The West Virginia process
38
does not offer such an opportunity.
Mitchell, however, injected some uncertainty into the picture.
The Mitchell Court approved a scheme which did not require that
pre-seizure notice be given to the debtor, laying great stress on the
fact that a judge was involved in the process. The West Virginia
attachment statute provides neither for notice nor for judicial involvement in the process .39 The West Virginia court chose to ignore
the United States Supreme Court's emphasis on the use of a judge,
noting that a clerk is an officer of the court and that neutral officers
other than judges have been approved by the United States Supreme Court as presiding officers in other types of hearings. Those
- 419 U.S. 601 (1975).

" GA. CODE ANN. §§ 46-101 to -104 (1974 Revision).
" 419 U.S. at 607.
" The West Virginia distress statute was held unconstitutional by the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in State ex rel. Payne v. Walden, 190 S.E.2d
770 (W. Va. 1972). Since the statute permitted a tenant's goods to be levied upon
without notice, it was held to violate due process requirements. The court found
that the actual effect of the statute was to keep the poor out of the courts. The court
in Persingerdistinguished Payne by noting that the attachment statute allowed for
an immediate hearing after seizure, whereas the distress statute had no provision
for a hearing until after the tenant posted double bond, breached the terms of that
bond, and the landlord brought suit.
"' W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38-7-1 to -3 (1966).
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cases which approved the use of neutral officers other than judges
as hearing officers are easily distinguishable, however, because
they deal with what are essentially administrative proceedings."
An attachment hearing is a legal proceeding. It is difficult, perhaps
impossible, for a clerk with no legal training to ascertain that the
material facts alleged in an affidavit do indeed give rise to the
statutory grounds leading to the issuance of a writ of attachment.
For these reasons, it may be very possible that the West Virginia
scheme is fatally defective because it lacks both the judicial participation and the requirements of notice mandated by the United
States Supreme Court.
11.

RAPE STATUTE-CONSTITUTIONALITY

The constitutionality of the former West Virginia rape statute4' was upheld by the West Virginia Supreme Court in the consolidated appeals of State ex rel. Rasnake v. Narick and Schnell
2 The appellants
v. Narick1
were indicted in Marshall County on
counts of forcible rape. In their constitutional challenge, petitioners asserted that the punitive provisions of the amended statute
unreasonably burdened their right to a trial by jury by encouraging
a guilty plea in order to avoid a potentially harsher jury verdict.
As authority for their positions, appellants relied upon United
States v. Jackson,4" in which the United States Supreme Court
invalidated a portion of the Federal Kidnapping Act," which provided for imposition of the death penalty on a defendant who exercised his right to a jury trial but had no provision for imposing the
death penalty on one who waived a jury trial or chose to plead
guilty. The Supreme Court held that this was an impermissible
burden on the constitutionally guaranteed right to a jury trial,
40 The court cited Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), and Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). These cases relied upon by the court to support the
position that the use of a neutral officer, other than a judge, as the presiding officer
at a hearing will meet due process requirements involved parole hearings, which are
administrative in nature. There is no fundamental right to parole, but one's right
to be free from governmental interference with his property is protected by the fifth
and fourteenth amendments. Thus, the need for fairness and precision in the attachment process is greater.
:' Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-15 (1966).
42 227 S.E.2d 203 (W. Va. 1976).

43390 U.S. 570 (1967).
" 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-1202 (1966). The penal provisions were contained in §
1201(a).
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finding that the increased risk of a jury imposing the death penalty
needlessly encouraged a defendant to waive his rights. 5
The Nevada Supreme Court, in Spillers v. State,4" invalidated
that state's rape statute, which had punitive provisions similar to
those contained in the Federal Kidnapping Act. Under the Nevada
statute, the judge could impose a prison sentence on the defendant
if he waived a jury trial or pleaded guilty, but a jury could impose
the death sentence. 7 Since the right to a trial by jury is a fundamental one,48 and the statute's provisions were viewed as coercing
a guilty plea,49 the statute was held unconstitutional.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that the
punishment and sentencing provisions of the West Virginia statute
differed from the Nevada and federal statutes which had been
declared unconstitutional. The amended statutes provided that if
a defendant is found guilty by a jury, the maximum sentence,
currently life imprisonment, would be imposed unless mercy is
recommended, in which case the penalty was imprisonment for ten
to twenty years. If the accused waived his right to a jury trial or if
he pleaded guilty, the trial judge had the same option. 0 The court
found that this scheme did not unconstitutionally encourage or
coerce a waiver of the right to a jury trial."
The petitioners contended that, although the statutes did not
vest unequal discretion in the judge and jury in imposing sentence,
there was a subtle compulsion in the plea bargaining process to
plead guilty and thus enhance the chances of obtaining a mitigated
sentence. They also argued that the lack of any standards to guide
the jury in determining what specific sentence to impose upon a
defendant was unconstitutional because of the likelihood that any
evidence presented on the issue of mitigation would tend to prejudice the jury on the issue of guilt.52
As precedent for denying this challenge, the majority cited
390 U.S. at 582-83.
84 Nev. 2d 23, 436 P.2d 18 (1968).
" N.R.S. 200.360(1) (1966).
"U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
" 84 Nev.2d at 30, 436 P.2d at 22.
Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-15 (1966).
'
'

5' 227 S.E.2d at 205.
52

Id.
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53
McGautha v. California,
in which the issue was whether a statute
which provided no specific standards in determining a sentence
was void. The Court held that it was impossible to set up any
standard in a criminal statute that could be expressed in broad
and fair language and provide specific guidelines to aid the jury in
determining sentence. 4

As to the issue of a subtle compulsion to plead guilty in order
to bargain for a mitigated sentence, the West Virginia court noted
with approval the holding of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Morrow.55 In that case, it was held
that a plea of guilty is not invalidated by the fifth amendment even
if it is motivated by a defendant's desire to accept a lesser pen56
alty.
The West Virginia court also noted that the requirements of
due process and equal protection in a criminal case include the
right for a defendant to be tried as are others charged with the
same offense and that a state has great latitude in setting up the
criminal procedure it wishes to follow.57 The court cited a Pennsylvania case in support of the proposition that a statute does not
deny equal protection simply because it provides for an indeterminate sentence."
Justice Neely and Justice Wilson disagreed with the majority's holding in the Rasnake and Schnelle appeals. The dissent
focused upon the practical difficulties of pleading innocence and
presenting evidence to prove that innocence, while at the same
time showing evidence of mitigation in the commission of the
crime which might tend to influence the jury in setting sentence.
As a remedy, they advocated a bifurcated trial with separate hearings determining guilt and sentence. 9
402 U.S. 183 (1971).
5' Id. at 208.

363 Mass. 601, 296 N.E.2d 468 (1973).
296 N.E.2d at 474, citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1969).
Lynch v. United States, 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 831
(1951).
51Commonwealth ex rel. Wallace v. Burke, 158 Pa. Super. 612, 45 A.2d 871
(1946).
11 227 S.E.2d at 209-10.
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SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

Board of Church Extension v. Eads,6 °
simple property issue greatly complicated
guarantees of the separation of church and
decided was whether the events leading to
verter clause in a deed had occurred.

dealt with, at base, a
by the constitutional
state. The issue to be
the operation of a re-

In 1950, the citizens of the town of Gilboa organized a Church
of God. The property on which the church building was constructed was conveyed to the local congregation with a provision
in the deed providing that the Gilboa Church of God was to continue to enjoy the benefits of the property so long as it maintained
doctrinal unity with the General Ministerial Assembly of the
Church of God, and that if ever the local congregation did not
maintain fellowship and doctrinal unity, the property was to vest
in the Board of Church Extension and Home Missions of the
Church of God.'
The Executive Committee of the West Virginia Ministerial
Assembly made the determination that a break of doctrinal unity
had occurred. The Executive Council of the General Ministerial
Assembly directed the sale of the property, and plaintiff corporation brought suit in West Virginia to aid in the sale, based on the
alleged break of doctrinal unity and the consequent operation of
the reverter clause. The defendants asserted that plaintiff corporation was an incorporated church which, by statute, was prohibited
from bringing suit in West Virginia. 2 They also contended that
since the General Ministerial Assembly had made no determination of a break in doctrinal unity between the General Ministerial
Assembly and the local congregation, the reverter clause had not
yet become operative. 3
The court emphasized in its opinion that the question of doctrinal unity was not one that could be properly decided by a state
court.64 The court first had to decide whether the church structure
involved was hierarchical or congregational. Justice Neely, in writ"

230 S.E.2d 911 (W. Va. 1976).
, Id. at 913.
GZ The defense was based on the provisions of Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 311-49 (1966).
230 S.E.2d at 919.
" Id. at 914.
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ing for the majority of a divided court, noted that hierarchical
churches, those with organized by-laws and pyramiding levels of
authority, have a long tradition of canon law and courts should,
and pursuant to the first amendment, must, respect the final adjudications of hierarchical church tribunals, provided the adjudication was not procured by fraud. 5 Congregational churches, he
wrote, are without such central internal authority, and consequently civil courts have been unable to rely upon canon law or any
final adjudication of a higher tribunal in deciding controversies
involving these churches. Therefore, in determining a controversy
involving a congregational church as a litigant, a civil court must
restrict itself to applying a completely neutral principle of law and
may not look toward the accomplishment of any particular result."6
The court then decided, without giving the basis for the decision, that the Church of God was a congregational church and
therefore the court was not bound by the decision of the West
Virginia Executive Council, nor by that of the National Executive
Council, that the Gilboa Church of God had fallen out of doctrinal
unity and fellowship. 7
The majority held that the reverter clause was plain and unambiguous, reasoning that since the clause called for the opinion
of the General Ministerial Assembly and the entire General Ministerial Assembly did not render such an opinion, the reverter clause
was inoperative and the national church organization had no right
to the property. 6
In a curious display of judicial technique which perhaps rendered the earlier segment of the opinion meaningless, the court
dismissed the appeal on its merits, holding that the plaintiff had
no standing to bring suit." By virtue of the applicable statute at
the time the suit was instituted," reasoned the court, no church
could qualify to do business in West Virginia, no organization
could bring suit without qualifying to do business in West Virginia,
and a plea of abatement was valid against any such corporation

"

230 S.E.2d at 916, citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
230 S.E.2d at 918, citing Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 423 U.S.

911 (1976).
230 S.E.2d at 919.
Id. at 919-20.
" Id. at 920-21.
o Former W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31-1-79 (1966).
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which attempted to sue in West Virginia. The majority characterized the Board of Extension as a church, barred from bringing suit,
rather than as an auxiliary organization which could bring suit.7'
Justice Flowers and Justice Berry dissented vehemently from
this opinion. Sharply criticized by the dissent was the majority's
reversal of the finding of facts of the lower court without a showing
that the finding was clearly wrong. 2 The dissent also noted that
recent West Virginia and United States Supreme Court cases have
decreed that religious bodies may decide matters of church government, policy, and administration.73 The majority was also criticized for classifying the Board of Church Extension as a church in
corporate form, prohibited from doing business in West Virginia.
The statute was amended, after the lower court decision but prior
to the decision by the Supreme Court of Appeals, so that maintenance of suit is no longer conditioned upon a prior finding that the
party is doing business in West Virginia." The dissenters argued
that the court should apply the law in effect at the time of its
decision. 5
IV.

SUCCESSION BY GOVERNOR

In State ex rel. Maloney v. McCartney,7" the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of West
Virginia's governors succession amendment,77 interpreted it as
being constitutionally applicable to the then sitting governor, and
issued a writ of mandamus instructing the Secretary of State to
refrain from certifying the incumbent governor as a Republican
candidate for the gubernatorial nomination in the 1976 primary
election. The court's opinion can be divided into two areas: the
constitutionality of the amendment under the United States Constitution, and application of the amendment.
Respondent, Governor Arch A. Moore, attacked the West Virginia governors succession amendment as violative of the four230 S.E.2d at 920, citing Powell v. Dawson, 45 W. Va. 780, 32 S.E. 213 (1899).
230 S.E.2d at 922, citing W. VA. R. Civ. P. 52; Lewis v. Dils Motor Co., 148
W. Va. 515, 135 S.E.2d 597 (1964).
11230 S.E.2d at 922, citing Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 423 U.S.
911 (1976).
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31-1-49(b)(1) (1975 Replacement Volume).
' 230 S.E.2d at 923, citing Bradley v. School Board, 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
78223 S.E.2d 607 (W. Va.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 927 (1976).
W. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 4 (1970).
2
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teenth amendment to the United States Constitution in that it
denied equal protection to those persons who would be inclined to
vote for Moore if given the opportunity. A lack of applicable authority for their respective stances plagued both the majority and
dissenting opinions on this question. Justice Neely, writing for the
majority, spoke in terms of differentiating voting restrictions
which work only to disenfranchise a group of citizens from those
which accomplish a "valid public purpose" and only incidently
disenfranchise voters.78 The "valid public purpose" rationale is a
vague standard which was met, the majority declared, by the West
Virginia governors succession amendment.
The dissent, however, proposed an equally vague "compelling
state interest" standard, which they felt was not met by the succession amendment. 9 Neither opinion cited any controlling authority on point, probably as a result of the fact that although over
twenty state constitutions restrict the ability of an incumbent governor to succeed himself, litigation as to the constitutionality of
such a restriction has only arisen under one such provision. Although the majority alluded to the twenty-second amendment to
the United States Constitution, which limits any one candidate to
two terms as President, as supportive of its position,"° the validity
of that amendment is not determinative of the validity of a similar
state provision under the fourteenth amendment.
The majority opinion, however, did not rest upon the validity
of the twenty-second amendment, but upon the meeting of the
standards of equal protection by the governors succession amendment.
The majority cited Maddox v. Forston,8' a Georgia case, as
authority for the proposition that restrictions upon succession of
incumbents is universally held to serve a rational public policy.2
The court then went on to define the state interest in such a provision and presented an historical dissertation in the process. Basically, the court viewed the restriction as necessary to prevent entrenchment of one man or machine in a political system, thereby
223 S.E.2d at 611.
7 Id. at 620.
Id. at 611.

226 Ga. 71, 172 S.E.2d 595 (1970), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 149 (1970).
223 S.E.2d at 611.
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afflicting the health of the state governmental system.8 The dissent did not attack this assertion of a state interest.84
Both opinions discussed a series of cases in which provisions
limiting the right to vote and the right to candidacy were found
unconstitutional. s The majority distinguished each on its facts
and found no sufficient state interest in either situation. Because
such state interest was found in the case before it, the court declared the succession amendment to be in compliance with the
United States Constitution. 6 The dissenters cited substantially
the same cases and analogized them to the case at bar as encompassing the same right to vote, but they failed to compare the lack
of a sufficient state interest found in the cited cases to any such
lack in the Maloney case. The dissent seemed intent on proving
that any unconstitutionality affected the actual voters rather than
the one ineligible candidate. 8
5
In one case cited by the dissent, Williams v. Rhodes,"
the
United States Supreme Court held that an Ohio restriction on a
party's qualifying for ballot position was unconstitutional. The
dissenters in Maloney presented selected portions of that opinion
as upholding the inviolate right to vote but ignored the express
finding in that case of a lack of a state interest which would have
legitimatized such a provision. The Court in Williams noted that
"[iun determining whether or not a state law violates the Equal
Protection Clause, we must consider the facts and circumstances
behind the law, the interests which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classi-

Id. at 611-12.
1 It is arguable that the reason for such a rule has evaporated and therefore
the rule should do likewise. With modern communication devices, a more educated
electorate, and modem protective provisions such as civil service, the likelihood of
political entrenchment is decreasing, especially in a relatively small voting area
such as West Virginia.
Thompson v. Mellon, 9 Cal. 3d. 96, 107 Cal. Rptr. 20, 507 P.2d 628 (1973)
(residency requirements); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (residency requirements); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (excessive filing fees without
"

write-in provisions).
223 S.E.2d at 612-13.
Id. at 619-21.
83Maddox v. Forston, supra n. 114, had a novel approach to this issue. The
court in that case found that the constitutional right to vote encompassed only the
right to vote for eligible candidates, and therefore, the state succession provision
only had to meet a valid interest standard in determining eligibility.

-9393 U.S. 23 (1968).
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fication."90 "The State here failed to show any 'compelling interest'
which justifies imposing such heavy burdens on the right to vote
''91

The dissent also argued that any state interest in support of
the Amendment should be determined by reference to the state
legislature." Anyone familiar with the West Virginia legislative
process is aware of the problems in determining the intent behind
any legislation: there is no recorded legislative history. What seems
to underlie the dissent's argument is the unstated issue of burden
of proof in determining a legitimate state interest. Both sides threw
around vague principles of inherent validity and inherent right to
vote, but neither mentioned the question of who must prove state
interest. The majority noted that it was incumbent upon the court
to "support every provision of the Constitutionof the State of West
Virginia"93 and impliedly found constitutionally sufficient state
interest behind the Amendment, via the aforementioned survey of
the reason for the rule. Perhaps the dissent's best attack would
have been to point out the lack of a proven state interest to legitimatize disenfranchisement."
While the constitutionality issue was perhaps the controlling
factor in the case, the validity of the succession amendment and
its application to Governor Moore was also discussed. Respondent
Moore argued that a discrepancy between the House and Senate
journals as to the substance of the Amendment rendered the adoption of the Amendment void, but the dissent and majority wisely
agreed that since it was clearly intended that the same provision
be adopted and presented to the voters for ratification, any ruling
which upheld Moore's contention would place every act of the
Legislature "at the mercy of secretaries, typesetters, and proof
readers."95
Application of the Amendment to respondent Moore was discussed, perhaps unnecessarily, by both the majority and dissent in
0
'
92

Id. at 30.
Id. at 31.
223 S.E.2d at 620.

" Id. at 612.

" It must be noted that no actual representative of the State of West Virginia
was a party in this action to protect the State's interest. Therefore, perhaps it was
proper for the Court to adopt such a protective approach to the case.
,1223 S.E.2d at 615.
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439

a trade-off of constitutional construction maxims. The dissent
96
argued interpretation of the Amendment in favor of eligibility;
the majority found no ambiguity in the wording of the Amendment
which would require judicial construction in the first place." In
light of the fact that the third sentence of the Amendment makes
express provision for respondent Moore's situation, the latter viewpoint appears the more reasonable. 8
9' Id. at 621-22.
g, Id. at 613.
g W. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 4. None of the executive officers men-

tioned in this article shall hold any other office during the term of his
service. A person who has been elected or who has served as governor
during all or any part of two consecutive terms shall be ineligible for the
office of governor during any part of the term immediately following the
second of the two consecutive terms. The person holding the office of
governor when this section is ratifiedshall not be prevented from holding
the office of governor duringthe term immediatelyfollowing the term he
is then serving. (Emphasis supplied.)

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1977

17

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 3 [1977], Art. 8

CONTRACTS
I.

LABOR AND MATERIAL EXPENSES

In Southern Erectors, Inc. v. Olga Coal Co.," a subcontractor
sought to enforce a materialman's lien against the owner of improved property. The owner filed a third party complaint against
the principal contractor, claiming that by the terms of their agreement the contractor had, in effect, agreed to indemnify the owner
against any such demands. The owner, in its third party complaint, sought to be allowed a set-off against the remainder of its
obligation to the contractor for any amount it might be required
to pay to release the lien.
The court noted that "where a contractor obligates itself to
furnish labor and materials, . . . in the absence of particular lan-

guage in the contract making the owner responsible for payment
of these labor and materials, the compensation of laborers and
materialmen must be borne by such contractor and not by the
owner.'" Having found that the contractor had agreed to provide
all labor and materials at a specified price,"0 ' the court ruled that
the owner was entitled to a set-off against his obligation to the
contractor for all expenses incurred by reason of the contractor's
failure to perform in accordance with their agreement.'0
I.

OPTION TO PURCHASE STOCK

In Quinn v. Beverages of West Virginia, Inc.,'03 the plaintiff
alleged the existance of an oral contract for employment which
included an option to purchase shares of stock in the employing
defendant corporation. The defendant asserted that the stock option provision of the alleged contract was "a contract for the sale
of securities" and was therefore unenforceable due to noncompli223 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1976).
Id. at 52.
The principal contract between the owner and the contractor was contained
in two documents; a quotation from the contractor and a purchase order from the
owner. The contractor's quotation promised to provide all labor and material, and
further noted that "the prices quoted are firm prices upon acceptance of the proposal." In response, the owner sent a purchase order which specified with greater
particularity the services the contractor was to provide. It was in accordance with
these terms that the contractor proceeded to perform the contract. Id.
,02
Id. at 53.
"° 224 S.E.2d 894 (W. Va. 1976).
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ance with the writing requirement of the Statute of Frauds relating
to security purchases.10 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap5
peals agreed with the defendant.'
In dealing with the question of whether an option to purchase
corporate stock is a "contract for the sale of securities" as contemplated by the Statute of Frauds, the court first noted that such an
option "has been designated as an offer which is in itself a contract."'' 6 As additional support for its finding, the court analogized an option to purchase corporate stock with an option to purchase real estate. Upon authority from other jurisdictions holding
that an option to purchase real estate is a unilateral contract of
sale subject to the writing requirement' 7 the court concluded that
"an option for the sale of . . . corporate stocks . . . creates a
contract of sale and is subject to the requirements of the Statute
of Frauds."'' 8
IX.

SuRETY LIABILITY UNDER CONTRACT BOND

In Cecil I. Walker Machinery Co. v. Stauben, Inc., "9 the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals dealt with the liability of a
surety under a contract bond. Pursuant to statutory requirements,"" a contract bond was given by a contractor to secure its
performance of a State Road Commission highway project. At the
culmination of the contractor's work on the project, a bulldozer
owned by the contractor and used on the bonded job was sent to
the plaintiffs shop for repairs. Upon completion of the repair work,
the bulldozer was transported by the contractor to a new job site.
Thereafter, the plaintiff instituted an action against the contractor
W. VA. CODE AN. § 46-8-319 (1966).
,s The trial court had held that the stock option provision was unenforceable
101

for noncompliance with the Statute of Frauds. In addition, the trial court ruled that
since a portion of the alleged contract was within the Statute of Frauds, the entire
alleged contract was within the Statute and was, therefore, unenforceable. The
Supreme Court of Appeals, however, held that, based on a consideration of the
intention of the parties, the option to purchase stock was severable from the remainder of the oral contract for employment. 224 S.E.2d at 901.
Id. at 897, citing Restatement (First) of Contracts § 46 (1932).
07 Pigeon v. Hatheway, 156 Conn. 175, 239 A.2d 523 (1968); Neely v. Sheppard,
185 Ga. 771, 196 S.E. 452 (1938); McGuirk v. Ward, 115 Vt. 221, 55 A.2d 610 (1947);
Bratt v. Peterson, 31 Wis. 2d 447, 143 N.W.2d 538 (1966).
1" 224 S.E.2d at 898.
,02 230 S.E.2d 818 (W. Va. 1976).
,,0 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-20 (1974 Replacement Volume).
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and the bonding company seeking to recover for the repairs made
to the bulldozer. The lower court granted judgment to the plaintiff
against the contractor, but denied any recovery from the surety.
The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's ruling
denying recovery from the bonding company.
The court noted initially that although the obligations of a
bond are generally construed most strongly against the bonding
company,"' the liability of a surety under a statutorily required
contract bond has its limits.112 Upon an examination of several
authorities, the court found those limits to be that "[a statutory
contract bond] would not be construed to expose the bonding
company to liability for repairs of a major nature which added
substantially to the value of the equipment, or to repairs or replacements which would not be substantially consumed on the
contract involved, or to repairs or replacements which could not be
reasonably expected to be used on or consumed in the performance
of the job covered by the contract.""' Applying these limitations
to the facts of the instant case,"' the court concluded that the
bonding company was not liable for the repairs to the bulldozer.
IV.

UNCONSCIONABILITY

In Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue,"5 the court, in a case of first
impression, dealt with the sufficiency of the defense of unconscionability in an action on a contract. The plaintiff oil company and
the defendant were parties to a lease agreement and a dealer contract whereby the defendant was to distribute the plaintiff's petroleum products at a gasoline service station leased from the plaintiff. Several years after the relationship began the plaintiff at230 S.E.2d at 820.
" Id. at 821.
113Id.

"I First, the court determined that the repairs substantially increased the
value of a part of the contractor's regular equipment. The amount owed for the
repairs was $8,299.19, and the increase in the market value of the bulldozer after
the repairs was estimated to be between $5,000 and $13,000. Second, it was found
that the plaintiff could not reasonably believe that the repairs were necessitated
by use of the bulldozer on the bonded project alone, because the plaintiff knew the
bulldozer was well used. Finally, the court stated that the repairs were made at a
time when the plaintiff could not reasonably believe the bulldozer would be further
used on the bonded project because the contractor had finished his work on that
project when the repairs were made. Id. at 820.
Its
223 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1976).
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tempted to terminate the two agreements. The defendant refused
to vacate the leased premises and the plaintiff brought an action

in unlawful detainer to recover possession. In his defense, the defendant asserted that the lease agreement and the dealer contract
contained an implied covenant on the part of the plaintiff not to
terminate the relationship without good cause, that the plaintiff
made representations that the agreement would not be canceled
without good cause, that the defendant had substantially performed his obligations under the agreement, and that the cancellation term in the dealer contract was void as against public policy.
The defendant also asserted that the two agreements were part of
an integrated business relationship and should be construed together rather than as separate documents. The plaintiff contended
that its action was based solely upon the lease agreement which
was clear and unambiguous, and not subject to interpretation or
variance by parol evidence.
The termination provision of the lease agreement allowed either party to terminate the lease upon ten days' written notice.
The lease agreement also contained an automatic year-to-year renewal upon the failure of either party to terminate. The dealer
contract provided that either party could avoid a similar automatic one year renewal of its obligations by giving notice of termination not less than sixty days prior to the expiration of any yearly
period. However, the plaintiff alone was given the additional right
to terminate the dealer contract upon ten days' written notice
when in its sole judgment the dealer indulged in practices tending
to impair the quality, good name, or reputation of the plaintiff's
products.
The circuit court granted the plaintiff's motion to strike certain of the defendant's defenses, and granted immediate possession of the premises to the plaintiff. On its own motion, the circuit
court certified the question of the legal sufficiency of the defenses
to the Supreme Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court of Appeals
reversed, finding the defenses legally sufficient, and remanded the
case to the circuit court for further proceedings.
The court initially found that the dealer contract and the lease
agreement should be construed together and considered as forming
one transaction." 6 The court based its determination on the ident,,I Id. at 437-38.
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ity of parties and subject matter, in addition to the fact that the
relationship between the documents was clearly apparant."7
The court next turned its attention to the ten-day cancellation
clause possessed only by Ashland,"' and stated that
In this case, considering the dealer contract and the lease
agreement as a part of an integrated business relationship, the
termination provisions are indeed incapable of being reconciled
in such a manner as to be clearly expressive of an intention
which can be said to have been within the reasonable contemplation of the contracting parties."'
Therefore, the court held "that the ten-day cancellation
clause contained in the dealer agreement, and available only to
Ashland, was and is unconscionable on its face."' 2 The effect of
the holding of unconscionability on the instant contract was left
for the trial court to determine in accordance with the remedies
and guidelines established by the Uniform Commercial Code.' 2'
As to the defenses regarding the issue of termination, the court
found that they were proper in a case where the termination provisions of an agreement had been found unconscionable.'22 The court
noted that parol evidence could be received by the trial court to
explain or supplement the writing where, due to a holding of unconscionability of termination provisions, the intention of the parties in regard to the issue of termination was ambiguous and
23
vague.'
,, Id. at 437.
"' Id. at 438.
"1

Id.

Id. at 440.
,z, Id., citing W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-2-302 (1966). The court had previously
''

determined that the transaction was a transaction in goods (petroleum products)
and therefore governed by the Uniform Commercial Code. W. VA. CODE ANN. §§
46-2-102 and 46-2-105 (1966).
'1' 223 S.E.2d at 440-41.
'2 Id. at 440, citing W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-2-202 (1966).
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4

Numerous criminal cases were decided by the Supreme Court
of Appeals in 1976. The court continued its liberal approach in
protecting the rights of the criminal defendant; however, very little
new law was written.
I.

CRIMINAL APPOINTMENTS

Much publicity heralded State ex rel. Partainv. Oakley, '2 the
most significant 1976 decision for practitioners of criminal law in
West Virginia. In Partainthe Supreme Court of Appeals declared
that the criminal appointment system needed restructuring. The
specific holding, however, was the denial of a writ of prohibition
to attorney George Partain. Partain had sought the writ to prevent
his appointment by the judge to defend Sam Lambert, a man
charged with a misdemeanor, but the writ was denied because
Partain had failed to join and serve process upon Lambert.'2 6 After
disposing of the case in this manner, the court proceeded to consider Partain's substantive claim that he was denied due process
of law under the appointment system because he was required to
provide his services without just compensation, and because his
appointed criminal load substantially impaired his private practice. '2 Noting that the weight of authority holds that an appointed
lawyer is due just compensation, the court indicated that the West
Virginia criminal appointment procedure is not, in and of itself,
unconstitutional, but where an attorney's appointed load is so
large as to occupy a substantial amount of his time and thereby
impair his earning ability, or where out-of-pocket expenses asso2, The following cases concerning criminal procedure will not be discussed in
this survey: State ex rel. Wine v. Bordenkircher, 230 S.E.2d 747 (W. Va. 1976)
(ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Casdorph, 230 S.E.2d 476 (W. Va. 1976)
(sufficiency of an indictment, voluntariness of confession); State v. Johnson, 226
S.E.2d 442 (W. Va. 1976) (exculpatory statements); State v. Cokely, 226 S.E.2d 40
(W. Va. 1976) (contempt); State v. Goff, 221 S.E.2d 891 (W. Va. 1976) (confession
of error by the state).
One other important criminal procedure case, State ex rel. Rasnake v. Narick,
227 S.E.2d 203 (W. Va. 1976), is discussed in the constitutional law section of this

survey.
1- 227 S.E.2d 314 (W. Va. 1976).
12 "[Alny person whose rights may be affected by the issuance of a writ by
this Court must be made a party and must be given notice. . . ... Id. at 317, citing
Kump v. McDonald, 64 W. Va. 323, 61 S.E. 909 (1908).
"2

227 S.E.2d at 318.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1977

23

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 3 [1977], Art. 8

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

ciated with appointed cases serve to reduce the attorney's net income "to a substantial and deleterious degree, the requirements
[of accepting appointed cases] must be considered confiscatory
and unconstitutional."' ' s
A foreshadowing of the Partaindecision occurred in Carter v.
Bordenkircher,29 a habeas corpus petition decided three days earlier. In Carter the central issue was whether the petitioner had
received effective assistance of counsel. The court found that counsel's defense of Carter had been adequate. Following the trial of the
case the original defense counsel became ill. Delays ensued and
finally a new attorney was appointed to argue post trial matters.
Carter was sentenced to a term of ten years. After sentencing, his
new attorney filed notice of intent to appeal. Believing that he had
fulfilled his role, the attorney did not pursue the appeal any further
and the appeal period lapsed with the appeal still not perfected.
The court remedied this situation by directing that Carter be resentenced at which time counsel could be appointed, and a timely
appeal could then be perfected,13 but the court ventured beyond
the immediate solution to Carter's problem and established a new
rule which will obviously serve to better protect the criminal defendant's rights. The court mandated that the same attorney who
tries a case should also be appointed to prosecute the appeal, unless good cause be shown to the trial court why he should not be
appointed. 3 '
The Supreme Court of Appeals offered a due process issue by
mentioning that Carter had "not raise[d] the question of whether
the method of appointing counsel is so defective as to deny him due
process of law."' 32 In this regard the court proffered one solution
to the appointment problem by suggesting a public defender system.'3 3 The West Virginia legislature apparently will not embrace
34
that particular solution.
"

Id. at 319.

226 S.E.2d 711 (W. Va. 1976).
at 716.
at 717.
" Id. at 716. In Partainthe attorney asserted that his due process rights were
being violated. Seemingly, the defendant's attack upon the criminal appointment
system would be stronger than the attorney's attack, presuming that the defendant
could show some correlation between the amount of compensation paid to the
attorney and the quality of the representation received.
133 Id.
,' As this survey goes to press the legislature appears ready to enact a bill
'

'13 Id.
31 Id.
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The overall thrust of Partainand Carter is that the court is
likely to declare that the failure to provide appointed attorneys
with just compensation is a violation of due process. The problem
with the present appointment scheme' 31 is that it provides unreasonably low compensation to appointed attorneys while appointed
cases frequently demand substantial amounts of time and effort by
counsel. The Partaindecision cites several reasons why the current
appointment system is inadequate. First, a rise in crime has increased appointed workloads. Second, representation has been extended to lineups, interrogations, preliminary hearings, and parole
and probation revocation hearings. Third, lawyers are more frequently being appointed in juvenile and competency, and in appeals and habeus corpus petitions. Fourth, the complexity of the
criminal law is increasing. And fifth, as the criminal law becomes
more complex, attorneys who do not specialize in criminal law will
have greater difficulty meeting the strict standard of performance
required to protect the defendant's due process rights.'36
In Partainthe court recognized the current problems of the
criminal appointment system, but refused to grant any relief until
July 1, 1977. '31 The postponement of relief was designed to allow
the West Virginia legislature time to restructure the appointment
system.'

3

1

11.

DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT

Two entrapment cases were decided during 1976. The first,
State v. Basham,'3' does not in any way change previous West
Virginia law. The decision simply repeats the standard definitions
of entrapment.'40 Although the entrapment claim in Basham was
which maintains an appointment system for indigent defendants, but substantially
increases the compensation to the appointed attorney. The new formula would
allow both an hourly fee and expenses, up to a maximum amount for each.
'3 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-3-1 (1977 Replacement Volume) provides in part:
[Tihe court shall, by order entered of record allow an attorney so appointed a fee not to exceed one hundred dollars in any misdemeanor case,
and a fee of not to exceed two hundred dollars in any felony case.
'' State ex rel. Partain v. Oakley, 227 S.E.2d 314, 320-22 (W. Va. 1976).
'

Id. at 323.
' See note 11, supra.

,39 223 S.E.2d 53 (W. Va. 1976).
"I "Entrapment may be defined as the inducement of one to commit a crime
not contemplated by him, for the mere purpose of instituting criminal prosecution
against him." State v. Jarvis, 105 W. Va. 499, 500, 143 S.E. 235, 236 (1928). It is
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not particularly strong, the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed
Basham's conviction for receiving stolen goods. The defendant had
claimed that while he had bought the goods knowing them to be
stolen, he did so pursuant to an agreement with a police officer.
The officer denied that arrangement, but Basham's evidence
tended to show a lack of guilty intent upon his part. The Court
held:
[Ilnasmuch as the defenses of entrapment and lack of criminal
intent are so inextricably interwoven in the circumstances of
the present case, the court is of the opinion that a definitive
treatment of the issues by instruction was obligatory."'
The second entrapment case, State v. Knight,'42 makes a distinctively new contribution to West Virginia law. Phrased by the
court the issue was:
whether a defendant who does not affirmatively present evidence of entrapment but relies on a denial of the commission
of the offense may also avail himself of the 4defense
of entrap3
ment based upon the State's evidence alone.
To this question the court responded affirmatively. However, the
use of the entrapment defense in this manner is limited to the
situation where the state's case in chief injects evidence of entrapment into the case.' 44
In Knight the court discussed the "objective" and
"subjective" tests for entrapment. An "objective" test would be
applied by the trial court while a "subjective" test would be applied by the jury. While noting that many courts have treated the
tests as mutually exclusive and adopted either one test or the other
as applicable to all entrapment situations,' the Supreme Court of
Appeals refused to adopt either test as applicable in all instances.
Instead the court determined that "the better rule is one which
always proper for police officers to "afford opportunities for the commission of
crime." State v. Basham, 223 S.E.2d 53, 58 (W. Va. 1976).
"' 223 S.E.2d at 59.
2 230 S.E.2d 732 (W. Va. 1976).

Id. at 734.
Id., citing United States v. Newcomb, 488 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1974).
" The federal courts have generally adopted the "subjective" test which allows the jury to test the validity of the defense. See United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423 (1973). However, the West Virginia court cited decisions from Iowa, Indiana, Virginia, Alaska and California that adopted the "objective" test. State v.
Basham, 230 S.E.2d 732, 736 (1976).
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approves both tests but applies them in a manner consistent with
the evidence."' Therefore, if sufficient evidence is available to
enable the trial court to find entrapment as a matter of law, then
the trial judge should decide the issue. " 7 Otherwise the issue
should be submitted to the jury if it has properly been raised by
the defendant or injected into the case by the state's evidence.
III.

DEFENSE OF INSANITY

During 1976 the court decided three cases involving the issue
of insanity. In State v. Myers'45 and State v. Pendry,'49 discussed
in the CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE section under
PRESUMPTIONS, each defendant had asserted that he was not legally
sane at the time of the commission of the crime. In State v.
Milam'"? the defendant further claimed that he was not legally
competent to stand trial. All three cases resulted in murder convictions, and in each instance the judgment was reversed and a new
trial was ordered. While the insanity issues were not identical in
all three cases, the cumulative effect of the three decisions is to
refine and clarify the meaning of State v. Grimm,-" a 1973 West
Virginia case that adopted an approach to insanity based upon the
MODEL PENAL CODE

(Proposed Official Text, 1962).

A review of the Grimm decision is important to more fully
understand Myers, Pendry and Milam. Grimm dispensed with the
so-called "M'Naughten rule" which had previously been adhered
to in West Virginia. The "M'Naughten rule," stated in the negative, required that the defendant must not have known the difference between right and wrong at the time the crime was committed. Only then could the defendant be found legally insane. 5 The
'4 230 S.E.2d at 737.
7 [If the evidence establishes, to such an extent that the minds
of reasonable men could not differ, that the officer or agent conceived the
plan and procured or directed its execution in such an unconscionable
way that he could only be said to have created a crime for the purpose of
making an arrest and obtaining a conviction, then the question is one for
the court to resolve without the necessity of submitting the matter to the

jury.
Id. at 737.
14 222 S.E.2d
I' 227 S.E.2d
' 226 S.E.2d
W'195 S.E.2d
,52Id. at 644.

300
210
433
637

(W.
(W.
(W.
(W.

Va.
Va.
Va.
Va.
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court found the "M'Naughten rule" to be outdated and considered
three newer definitions of insanity. Rejected were the "Durham
rule""5 and the "irresistible impulse" test."4 Adopted by the tribunal was an approach based on § 4.01 of the MODEL PENAL
CODE.'-, That section reads:

(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the
time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he
lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law.
(2) As used in this article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.''
Besides adopting this modern approach to the definition of insanity, the court also held that the trial court properly refused an
instruction informing the jurors that if a verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity were returned, "the judge would inquire into the
defendant's mental condition and take appropriate action."157 This
holding was modified in Milam and will be discussed below.
The first of the three insanity cases decided by the Supreme
Court of Appeals in 1976 was State v. Myers."INeither this decision nor the two that followed altered the requirement that the
defendant prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.
This standard is well established in West Virginia,'5 ' and has not
been affected by the new constitutional standards for presumptions announced in Pendry. Another major issue in Myers was to
what extent a psychiatrist may utilize hospital records of the defendant when explaining to the jury the basis of his professional
opinion as to the mental competency of the defendant. The recur,1Under the "Durham rule," "an accused is not criminally responsible for a
crime if his unlawful act was the product of a mental disease or a mental defect."
Id. at 645, citing Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (1954).
"I "The doctrine of irresistible impulse does not preclude the mental capacity
of a defendant to know right from wrong, but advances the theory that the mind of
a defendant is so diseased that he has no freedom of will and that his powers of
self-control and choice have been destroyed by disease." State v. Painter, 135 W.
Va. 106, 125, 63 S.E.2d 86, 97 (1950).
"S MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).

State v. Grimm, 195 S.E.2d 637, 645 (1973).
Id. at 645.
222 S.E.2d 300 (W. Va. 1976).
See State v. Evans, 94 W. Va. 47, 117 S.E. 885 (1923).

I56

"'
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ring problem here is that the doctor frequently relies upon records
which have been kept by other people. Many times such records
predate the time that the psychiatrist first examines the patient.
The court had no difficulty in holding that the utilization of reasonably authenticated records may be revealed to the jury when
first, the records were kept in the "regular course of professional
care or treatment" of the accused, and second, the records were in
fact used by the psychiatrist in arriving at his opinion.' 0 The Supreme Court of Appeals again encountered this.issue and reached
61
and State v. Milam. 62
the same result in State v. Pendry"
One final issue involved in insanity defenses must be considered. As stated above, in Grimm the court declared that the jury
need not be instructed as to what the disposition of the defendant
would be if he were found not guilty by reason of insanity. The
court reasoned that informing the jury about this matter would be
advising the jury of a form of punishment to be imposed upon the
defendant, and punishment is a matter for the court to consider.
However, the issue arose again in State v. Myers. 163There the court
held that it was error for the trial judge not to declare a mistrial
or instruct the jury as to the impropriety of a remark made by the
prosecutor in his closing argument that the defendant would be
turned loose if confined to "Weston Hospital or the Veterans' Hospital."' 64 Finally, in State v. Milam, 6 the court decided to qualify
the position taken in Grimm. The jury in Milam had retired for
fifteen minutes when the foreman sought the advice of the court.
We was wanting to know what the sentence would be. We
don't want to send him to the pen, in other words. We was
wanting something like a sanitarium. "
Without further explanation the court reread to the entire jury the
instruction relating to the possible verdicts. An hour later the jury
returned a verdict of first-degree murder with a recommendation
of mercy. The Supreme Court of Appeals, citing other jurisdictions
that allow such an instruction when the defendant requests, 67'
222 S.E.2d at 304.

260
"'
12
"

227 S.E.2d 210 (W. Va. 1976).
226 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1976).
222 S.E.2d 300 (W. Va. 1976).

,64
Id. at 306.
,65
226 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1976).
,66
Id. at 438.
26,

See Schade v. State, 512 P.2d 907 (Alaska 1973); People v. Cole, 382 Mich.
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stated that an instruction informing the jury of the disposition of
the defendant upon a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
might be favorably received by the court when the evidence of a
case warranted. The clear implication is that the evidence in
Milam would warrant such an instruction." 8 The instruction must
be carefully drawn and accurately specify the procedure estab-

lished in WEST VIRGINIA CODE ANN. § 27-6A-3 and §§ 27-5-1 et seq.,
governing the disposition of the defendant who is found not guilty
by reason of insanity.
IV.

PREJUDICIAL PUBLIcITY DURING TRIAL

State v. Williams'69 reveals a situation involving prejudicial
publicity during trial. Williams was on trial for possession of LSD
with intent to sell. Jury deliberations lasted from one evening into
the next day, but the jury was not sequestered overnight. Before
dismissing the jury for the evening, the judge gave the traditional
instructions prohibiting the jurors from discussing the case with
anybody and cautioning against reading any news articles or listening to any news report concerning the case. Still the jury foreman read a newspaper account about a man who was arrested
when leaving the courthouse after court adjourned for the day. The
arrested man was also charged with possession of LSD. During
deliberations on the second day, the foreman informed the other
jurors of the contents of the newspaper article. Following a verdict
of guilty the defense attorney requested that the judge question the
jury concerning the newspaper article. This was done and it was
discovered that the foreman had mentioned the article to the other
jurors. The court then asked each juror whether his knowledge of
the article had influenced him in arriving at his verdict. Each juror
responded in the negative. After asking the jury one more question
at defendant's request, the court refused to go further and ask the
jurors if they were aware that the arrested man had been seated
in the courtroom with the defendant's wife. Satisfied with the
results of his inquiry the judge let the guilty verdict stand.
695, 172 N.W.2d 354 (1969). Contra, State v. Conforti, 53 N.J. 239, 250 A.2d 6
(1969); Rollins v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 575, 151 S.E.2d 622 (1966).
I" Milam, an elderly man, had been institutionalized between 1967 and 1970.
One psychiatrist described the defendant as "quite disorganized" and declared that
his thought process was "disconnected and disorganized." Even the doctor who
declared that Milam was fit for trial stated that the defendant's memory was
"strongly clouded with his delusions." State v. Milam, 226 S.E.2d 433, 437 (1976).
"1'230 S.E.2d 742 (W. Va. 1976).
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Although the trial judge was careful to protect the defendant's
rights, the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the
judge had not been careful enough. The court indicated that the
trial court is obligated to conduct an inquiry if there is any possibility of prejudice to the defendant,7 0 and the defendant need not
7
show "actual" prejudice, but only the probability of prejudice.1 1
If the court determines that there is a possibility of prejudice, he
must then question the jurors to determine whether a new trial
should be granted. To this point the trial judge in Williams had
correctly proceeded. However, the juror's personal opinion as to
whether or not he was influenced by exposure to the news article
should not be taken as conclusive,1 2 and here the trial judge committed error. Stating that each case must turn upon its individual
circumstances, the court in Williams determined that a set of cumulative factors required reversal.
V.

PRESUMPTIONS

State v. Pendry"I was perhaps the most important criminal
procedure case decided by the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals during 1976. Besides dealing with issues concerning voir
dire' and the defense of insanity, the Pendry decision places new
restrictions upon the use of instructions by the criminal trial court
which allow the jury to accept presumptions or draw inferences
from the evidence produced at trial. Since the origins of West
Virginia jurisprudence, all murders have been presumed to be
murder in the second degree and in order to raise the offense to
murder in the first degree, the burden of proof has been on the
State, while the burden to reduce the offense to manslaughter has
been on the defendant. Instructions stating this legal formula have
Id. at 746.
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
r 227 S.E.2d 210 (W. Va. 1976).
The defense counsel had challenged four jurors for cause, asserting bias. The
trial judge had refused the challenge and had expressed doubt as to the propriety
of separately questioning jurors. The appellate court indicated that the judge's
refusal of counsel's request for separate questioning was not itself reversible error.
However, the Court proceeded to interpret W. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-6-12 (1966) to
allow a "trial judge, in his discretion, . . . the authority to utilize any procedure,
including examination of a prospective juror out of the presence of other jurors, if
he believes that the impartiality of the jury may be better determined in that
manner." 227 S.E.2d at 216.
"~

'
272
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long been used in West Virginia and approved by the Supreme
Court of Appeals. However, in Pendry, the court declared that:
the State is not entitled to an instruction which requires a jury
to accept as proved beyond a reasonable doubt any element of
the criminal offense charged, and this concept embraces presumptions (more properly inferences) as to which the jury may
be instructed; and a defendant in a criminal case cannot be
required to present evidence either in terms of going forward
with the evidence or in terms of bearing the burden of persuasion in connection with any material element of the crime
charged.7 5
Readily admitting that "[t]here is no highway by which any
of us can safely walk through" the subject of presumptions,' the
court moved ahead with its assessment of the effect upon West
Virginia law of the United States Supreme Court decision in
7
Mullaney v. Wilbur.'
Mullaney held "that the Due Process
Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation
when the issue is properly presented in a homocide case."'7 From
this holding the West Virginia court decided, as noted above, that
murder could no longer be presumed to be murder in the second
degree, and that the jury could no longer be instructed that it is
permissible to infer malice from the deliberate use of a deadly
weapon. Nor may a defendant be required to bear the burden of
persuasion or to introduce evidence to rebut a presumption that he
intended the consequences that resulted from the use of a deadly
weapon."' The Supreme Court of Appeals openly confessed in
Pendry that it could not in that case "undertake to discern the full
impact of Mullaney upon all statutes, instructions and presumptions previously accepted as accurate statements of the law govern" Id. at 220.
'' Id. at 222, citing Roe v. M & R Pipelines, Inc., 202 S.E.2d 816, 820 (W. Va.
1973).
Few areas of the law are as confusing or as hotly debated as the law of
presumptions. As one text writer put it, "Every writer of sufficient intelligence to appreciate the difficulties of the subject matter has approached
the topic of presumptions with a sense of hopelessness and has left it with
a feeling of despair." Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WASH. L. REv. 225
(1937).
421 U.S. 684 (1975).
'T'
' '

Id. at 704.
227 S.E.2d at 223.
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ing criminal cases in this State."'' 0 But the court has made a
profound beginning at this task. The tribunal has declared that
due process requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
and without the help of inferences or presumptions, all elements
of a crime, and that a criminal defendant cannot be compelled to
introduce evidence or carry the burden of persuasion to disprove
any element of the crime.
VI.

RESTRICTIONS ON PROBATION

Among the criminal procedure cases decided by the Supreme
Court of Appeals last year, Louk v. Haynes 8' presents the most
interesting factual situation. The petitioner, Howard Louk, had
entered a plea of guilty to the charge of marijuana possession with
intent to sell. A young man, apparently of college age, Louk appeared for sentencing on March 31, 1975. The court inquired of the
petitioner
whether he was willing to abide by certain terms of probation,
including attending church every Sunday, abstaining from
"drinking" and "boozing", working two jobs a day commencing
the next day, observing a 10:00 p.m. curfew, .

.

. staying away

from college campuses and girls' dormitories, getting a haircut,
and becoming
a "16-hour-a-day" working man for the next five
years.'8 2
Louk agreed to these conditions and went to get his haircut. The
judge had requested that he return to court and show compliance
with that particular condition. The next day, accompanied by his
father and with a haircut, Howard Louk returned to the circuit
court. The petitioner informed the trial judge that he had one job
in his father's restaurant and a second job with a building contrator. The judge, however, felt that "working on a farm or cutting
timber was the proper work for someone who needed 'behavior
modification'."'' 3 So the judge suggested that Louk contact a
Mr. Isner, who later hired the young man and provided him with
housing on the farm.
On April 4, 1975, a final order establishing the terms of the
probation was entered. Somewhat less stringent than the condi"

Id. at 220.

1R

223 S.E.2d 780 (W. Va. 1976).
Id. at 784.

"3

Id. at 785.

"'
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tions offered by the judge on March 31, the order required Louk
to be of good behavior, avoid injurious habits, comply with the
regulations of the Department of Probation, work satisfactorily at
gainful employment, and observe an 11:00 p.m. curfew. After defense counsel had signed and approved this order, a final condition
was manually interlined into the order. By this final condition Mr.
Isner was designated a "volunteer probation officer". Also, "while
it is not evident from the order or the record

. . .

it is apparent

that the judge made employment and residence on the Isner farm
conditions of probation."'' 4
On the Isner farmLouk was given adequate but substandard
housing. Besides working for Isner at very low wages, the petitioner
apparently rendered services beneficial to Judge Triplett, who
leased a piece of property adjacent to Isner's farm. After working
on the Isner farm for two months, Louk became dissatisfied and
returned to his parents' home. The next morning he voluntarily
surrendered to his probation officer, was arrested and incarcerated.
Although Louk was orally informed of the charges against him, a
written copy of the charges was not provided to him or his attorney
before the revocation hearing. At that hearing on July 15, 1975, the
petitioner's probation was revoked and his one to five year sentence was executed. One of the stated violations of probation was
Louk's refusal to work for Mr. Isner on his farm.
The state confessed error and the revocation was rescinded.'8
The Supreme Court of Appeals found that the condition requiring
Louk to work on the Isner farm was tantamount to "involuntary
servitude", a violation of the petitioner's procedural due process
right, and therefore void.' 8 Also, the Supreme Court of Appeals
again took the opportunity to express the procedures the state is
constitutionally obligated to follow in parole and probation revocations.8" Morrissey v. Brewer,'s and Gagnon v. Scarpelli,'8 I are the
"' Id. at 785.
" Id. at 790.
' A convicted offender may be confined in the penitentiary or, in
certain circumstances as provided by statute, to other county or state
penal or rehabilitative institutions, but the confinement authority of the
trial judge is limited to such facilities.
Id. at 789.
I" In 1974, revocation procedures were considered in light of two U.S. Supreme
Court cases, Morrissey v.Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778 (1973). In a very confusing and divided opinion, the West Virginia court
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two most recent United States Supreme Court decisions dealing
with probation and parole revocations. Probation and parole revocations are constitutionally indistinguishable when determining
what due process must be afforded the person who risks the loss
of his liberty. The effect of Morrissey and Gagnonupon revocation
proceedings is to require that the probationer or parolee be provided with (1) a preliminary hearing before an independent officer
to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the
arrested person violated the terms of his probation or parole,'90 and
(2) a final revocation hearing "9' wherein the State is required to a)
provide the probationer or parolee with written notice of the
charges against him, b) disclose the evidence the State has against
him, c) allow the probationer or parolee an opportunity to be
heard, and d) allow him the right to confront witnesses and crossexamine them to the extent that it is reasonably possible to do so.
The final revocation hearing must also be held before a neutral
officer who must make a written statement of his findings.'92 In
Louk the state had failed first, to provide the petitioner with a
preliminary hearing, and second, to present to him a written notice
of the charges against him.
rejected the prisoner's claim that he had been denied due process of law because
counsel was not appointed to represent him at the revocation hearing, but the court
upheld his assertion that the failure to appoint an attorney had denied him equal
protection. See Dobbs v. Wallace, 201 S.E.2d 914 (W. Va. 1974).
408 U.S. 471 (1972).
411 U.S. 778 (1973).
" The West Virginia court suggests that "the most logical 'independent officer' would be a county magistrate." Louk v. Haynes, 223 S.E.2d 780, 789 (1976).
' To the extent that W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-12-10 (1977 Replacement Volume) fails to require a preliminary probable cause violation hearing, it is unconstitutional. Louk v. Haynes, 223 S.E.2d 780, 789 (1976).
192 Id. at 790.
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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
I.

CHILD CUSTODY-PRIOR DECREE BY FOREIGN COURT

In Adams v. Bowens,"13 the court considered the jurisdiction
of West Virginia courts to determine child custody when a foreign
decree awarding custody of the child has previously been entered.
A mother obtained a divorce from her husband in Kentucky, and
was awarded custody of their child. Several months after the divorce the father was awarded temporary custody by the Kentucky
court. "4 The father then petitioned a West Virginia court to give
full faith and credit to the Kentucky temporary custody order and
award him custody of the child. The mother filed a motion to
dismiss, contending that the Kentucky temporary custody order
was void because the father, though knowing of her whereabouts,
failed to provide her with notice of the custody hearing. The circuit
court found as a matter of fact that the mother had not been given
notice of the Kentucky custody proceeding, but, nevertheless, held
that it was without jurisdiction to determine the question of custody. The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and
remanded the case to the circuit court with directions that it take
jurisdiction of the controversy.
Initially, the court observed that the circuit court was granted
jurisdiction of the subject matter in controversy by the West Virginia Constitution.15 Additionally, it was found that the circuit
court had jurisdiction over the parties to the proceeding, as the
mother, the father, and the child were all before the court.10 The
,, 230 S.E.2d 481 (W. Va. 1976).
", The custody decree of the divorce court granted certain visitation privileges
to the father. In accord with those privileges and one month after the divorce, the
father took his son for a weekend. However, the father failed to return the boy, and
refused to permit the mother to see the child or know of his whereabouts for a period
of four months. The mother learned that the child was at a certain doctor's office,
and on that occasion regained physical custody of the child. By that time she had
remarried and become a resident of West Virginia. Apparently, it was sometime
before the mother regained custody of the child that the father petitioned the
Kentucky court for custody of his son.
"
W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6.
"' 230 S.E.2d at 484. The court based jurisdiction on "the physical presence
of the child together with jurisdiction over the parties." Id. However, the court
indicated that the physical presence of the child alone is all that is required for
jurisdiction in custody proceedings in West Virginia, stating that:
[T]here are respectable authorities which support the view that the
child's physical presence within a state is sufficient to give that state's
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court decided that the only other rationale indicated by the circuit
court's ruling for its refusal to take jurisdiction of the case was its
apparent conclusion that the question of custody, having been
determined by the Kentucky court, was res judicata and could only
be changed by the Kentucky courts."'7 The Supreme Court of Appeals pointed out that the matter was not res judicata, restating
the well established rule in West Virginia that:
[a] foreign decree or order awarding the custody of a minor
child in a divorce suit is not res judicata in a subsequent proceeding in this State, involving the custody of the infant, where
there has been such change in the conditions since the rendition
of the foreign judgment as to render its modification desirable
for the welfare and protection of the child. 98
Noting that a change in condition had been alleged, and that the
circuit court had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, the court ordered the circuit court to take jurisdiction and
determine the matter of custody.
11.

NOTICE OF ADOPTION TO PUTATIVE FATHER

In Matter of Daft's Adoption,'99 the court evaluated the constitutional sufficiency of notice of adoption proceedings by publication to the putative father of an illegitimate child. A married couple had petitioned the circuit court for adoption of an illegitimate
child, and had attached to their petition the duly acknowledged
written consent of the child's mother to the adoption. The child's
putative father was found to be a non-resident of the State of West
Virginia, and a fugitive from justice whose whereabouts were unknown. In an effort to notify the putative father of the adoption
proceedings, the petitioners placed a notice of the pending proceeding in a local newspaper for two successive weeks, and posted
courts jurisdiction to determine and award custody.

We subscribe

to this principle ....
Id.
"I The court noted that:

[a]lthough it was not expressly stated by the [circuit] court, it appears
that its holding was premised on the proposition that the question of
custody, having been determined by the Circuit Court of Boyd County,
Kentucky, was res judicata and that any change of custody must be tried
and determined by that court.

Id.
'" Id., quoting Stapler v. Leamons, 101 W. Va. 235, 132 S.E. 507 (1926).
,' 230 S.E.2d 475 (W. Va. 1976).
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a copy of the notice at the county courthouse. Nevertheless, the
circuit court refused the petition for adoption, ruling that the petitioners had provided inadequate notice to the child's natural father.
The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the good
faith efforts of the petitioners in attempting to notify the natural
father of the illegitimate child of the proceedings was ". . . reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to appraise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections." ' The court noted that
although the statute in effect at the time the petition for adoption
was filed did not require that a putative father receive any notice
of proceedings concerning the adoption of his illegitimate child,"°,
the reasoning of Stanley v. Illinois"2 and Hammack v. Wise"'3
made it necessary that the putative father be given notice and an
opportunity to be heard."4 Realizing that no particular form of
notice had been fashioned for appraising the natural father of the
pending adoption proceedings by the relevant case law, the court
applied generally recognized principles for evaluating the constitutional adequacy of the notice provided in a particular situation.
Acknowledging the absence of any adequate alternatives under the
circumstances, the court found the published notice employed by
the petitioners to be constitutionally sufficient to notify the putative father of the adoption proceedings.0 5
2
Id. at 476, quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 314 (1950).
211

Id. at 475.

- 405 U.S. 645 (1972). The Stanley Court struck down an Illinois statute
which declared illegitimate children to be wards of the state upon the death of their
unwed mother without affording the putative father an opportunity to be heard in
respect to his fitness for custody. However, the rationale of Stanley, that putative
fathers have constitutionally protected interests in their illegitimate children, was

believed to apply with equal scope to adoption proceedings involving illegitimate
children. This belief was reinforced by the Supreme Court's decision in Rothstein
v. Lutheran Social Services, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972), vacating and remanding an
adoption case involving a putative father who had received no notice of the adoption proceedings concerning his illegitimate child for reconsideration in light of the
Stanley decision.
211 S.E.2d 118 (W. Va. 1975) (right of putative father of an illegitimate
child, as opposed to maternal grandmother, to custody of the child).
230 S.E.2d at 475-76 (W. Va. 1976).

Id. at 476.
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Prior to the court's decision in Matter of Daft'sAdoption, but
subsequent to the filing of the adoption petition in the circuit
court, the West Virginia Legislature amended the West Virginia
Code to define a "determined father" and to provide a requirement
of and a method for notifying determined fathers of illegitimate
children of any adoption proceedings concerning their illegitimate
children. 6 Previously, in the case of a proceeding for the adoption
of an illegitimate child, the Code required only that the petition
for adoption be accompanied by the duly acknowledged written
consent of the mother of such child."' The applicable statute now
requires that a determined father, as defined in the amended provision,"'8 as well as the mother should be given notification of any
adoption proceeding concerning his illegitimate child.00 Unless either the mother or the determined father has abandoned the child
or is insane, the consent of both parents is now required to accompany the petition for adoption of an illegitimate. However, if either
the mother or the determined father has abandoned the child or is
insane, only the consent of the other parent is required, but the
abandoning parent must be given notice of the pending proceeding. If the determined father is a resident of the state, the alleged
abandoning parent must be personally served. However, if after
due diligence personal service cannot be obtained on the abandoning parent, or if the determined father is a non-resident of the
state, notice will be sufficient if sent by registered mail to the last
known address of the alleged abandoning parent, such notice being
effective upon mailing.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-4-1 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-4-1 (1976 Replacement Volume) provided in perti-

nent part:

(a) .

.

. Consent to the adoption of a minor child shall be required and

obtained as follows:
(2) In the case of an illegitimate child sought to be adopted, the written

consent, duly acknowledged, of the mother of such illegitimate child
sought to be adopted must be obtained and presented with the petition.
2'a

W.

VA. CODE ANN.

§ 48-4-1(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976) provides that:

As used in this article, the term "determined father" means any person
who:
(1) Has been found guilty under the provisions of article seven [§ 48-71 et seq.], chapter forty-eight of this Code; or
(2) Has acknowledged his parental status by contributing to the child's
support, by living with the mother, at the time of conception, or by
admitting paternity by any means.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-4-1(b) (Cum. Supp. 1976).

2
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Despite the recent statutory amendment discussed above, it
cannot yet be said that the question of when the natural father of
an illegitimate child is entitled to notice of adoption proceedings
has been completely answered. The effective ability of the statute
to control the possible situations involving fathers of illegitimates
will depend primarily upon how narrowly or widely the Supreme
Court of Appeals decides to apply the reasoning of Stanley v.
Illinois to adoption proceedings. Unfortunately, the Daft decision
does not indicate a great deal about the scope of application the
court is likely to give Stanley. However, the court apparently assumed in Daft that the petitioners were constitutionally required
to provide some sort of notice to the illegitimate's putative father
of the pending adoption proceedings. 1 ' It does not appear from the
statement of facts whether the putative father there involved
would have satisfied the statutory definition of a determined father. If he did not, it seems arguable that the court has already
recognized that there are natural fathers of illegitimate children
who, although not meeting the statutory definition of a determined
father, are constitutionally entitled to receive notice of adoption
proceedings. Should that be the case, it remains to be seen what
factors will distinguish the undetermined putative father who is
entitled to notice from the undetermined father who has no protected interest in his illegitimate child and is therefore not entitled
to notice.
On the other hand, Stanley could be interpreted as not requiring notice to any putative father who does not meet the statutory
definition of a determined father. Other courts which have considered Stanley's impact on adoption proceedings have limited its
scope by interpreting the decision to require notice to the putative
father only when the factual circumstances are similar to those in
Stanley."' Additionally, most courts which have considered statutes similar in effect to the statute under consideration in Daft and
which have declared them to be insufficient have been presented
with circumstances similar to those found in Stanley.2"' By requir210 Otherwise, the court's decision that the notice employed by the petitioners
was constitutionally adequate would have been unnecessary.
M'See, e.g., Dep't of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Herzog, 317 So. 2d
865 (Fla. App. 1975). In Stanley, the putative father had lived with the mother and
his illegitimate children intermittently for many years.
"I See Miller v. Miller, 504 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1974) (Oregon statute); Adoption of Walker, 360 A.2d 603 (Pa. 1976).
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ing that the putative father support the child or in some other way
have his paternity established before he is accorded the statutory
rights of a determined father, the statute follows this somewhat
narrower reading of Stanley by recognizing a constitutional interest of putative fathers in their illegitimate children only under
circumstances similar to those in Stanley, and requiring that only
those fathers be given notice and an opportunity to be heard in
adoption proceedings.
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EVIDENCE
I.

AUTHENTICITY OF WRITINGS

In Casto v. Martin,13 the court dealt with whether a writing
was properly admitted into evidence. The executrix of an estate
brought an action to collect on a note. During the trial an unsigned
and wholly typewritten memorandum, purportedly from the defendant to the deceased, was admitted into evidence through the
testimony of the deceased's accountant. The accountant had received the memo and an unsigned note from the deceased in order
to determine if the sale of stock qualified for capital gains treatment.
The primary evidentiary principle discussed by the court in its
opinion was that the party attempting to admit the letter must
show the authenticity or genuineness of the letter. " While the
most common way to show authenticity or genuineness is through
handwriting, it may also be shown through direct or circumstantial
evidence." ' This indirect or circumstantial method of demonstrating authenticity has generally relied on factors in addition to the
contents of the letter. " ' However, in Casto the court relied on the
principle that when the contents of a writing reveal a knowledge
or other trait peculiarly referable to only one person, the contents
of the writing alone may be sufficient to establish authenticity.
The Casto court found that while the memorandum was unsigned
and wholly typewritten, the contents of the memorandum disclosed details of a very complicated business transaction which
could have been known only by the defendant; thus, the contents
of the letter alone were sufficient to show genuineness." 7
213

230 S.E.2d 722 (W. Va. 1976). This case also is reported in the CON-

TRACTS section of this Survey.
2" Id. at 726-28.

E.g., Maynard v. Bailey, 85 W. Va. 679, 102 S.E. 480 (1920).
In Maynard v. Bailey, 85 W. Va. 679, 102 S.E. 480 (1920), the court looked
at all the circumstances surrounding the writing, including the type of stationary,
the return address, and the format of the letter, before determining admissibility.
In State v. Huffman, 141 W. Va. 55, 87 S.E.2d 541 (1955), the court relied on the
extraneous factor that the letter could not have passed between any parties except
the purported writer and the person to whom it was delivered.
227 230 S.E.2d at 727. The court relied on United States v. Sutton, 426 F.2d
1202 (D.C. Cir. 1969) for this principle. However, the court had previously recognized this principle in State v. Huffman, 141 W. Va. 55, 87 S.E.2d 541 (1955),
though it was not necessary to apply it in that case.
225

2,M
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The court in Casto, and in the other cases dealing with the
proof of authenticity through indirect or circumstantial evidence,
stressed that the purported author did not deny or attempt to
discredit the writing. 218 However, if the matter is really within the
exclusive knowledge of the purported author, this denial of the
writing should not determine the genuineness or authenticity issue
of the admission of the writing into evidence, but should be left to
the jury to decide the weight to be given to the writing.
Since the court held that the memo was authenticated by its
contents, the court found that the29trial court had not abused its
discretion in admitting the memo.
"1230

S.E.2d at 727.

219 Authenticity

ON EVIDENCE,

is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. McCoRMICK
§§ 218-28 (E. Cleary ed. 1972).
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INSURANCE
I.

CONTRACT AMBIGUITIES

The task of the court in Prete v. Merchants Property Insurance Co.,220 was to interpret the language of an insurance contract
to decide whether the plaintiffs' building materials were insured
by the defendant at the time of their destruction by fire. The
clause in question insured construction materials, equipment, and
supplies "all while in or on the described buildings, structures or
temporary structures, or in the open (including within vehicles) on
the described premises or within 100 feet thereof.

'2

' The ambigu-

ity arose with regard to materials stored in a building within one
hundred feet of the insured premises. Were the materials insured
or did the materials "within 100 feet" also have to be "in the
open?"
The defendant successfully contended in the circuit court that
the language intended coverage of 1) materials in the described
buildings and 2) materials in the open on the premises or within
100 feet thereof; this would preclude recovery for the destroyed
materials in a building eighty-two feet from the insured premises.
On the other hand, the plaintiff maintained that all construction
materials were insured under the policy, whether 1) in the described buildings, or 2) in the open on the described premises, or
3) within 100 feet of the premises, either inside or outside of a
building.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found that the
policy provision was ambiguous and applied the "guiding principle
of construction in cases of insurance contracts," which is to construe the language liberally in favor of the insured.12 Therefore,
coverage under the clause was held to extend to any location within
100 feet of the premises.
- 223 S.E.2d 441 (W. Va. 1976).
"I Id. at 443.
2 Lusk v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 195 S.E.2d 163 (W. Va. 1973); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 154 W. Va. 448, 175 S.E.2d 478 (1970).
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I.

APPOINTMENT OF CITY OFFICIALS

Robb v. Zegeer25 involved a dispute between two elected officials of the City of South Charleston, the mayor and the municipal
court judge, as to which had the authority to appoint a deputy
municipal court clerk. The court held that the city charter provision granting express power to the municipal judge to appoint a
clerk of the municipal court"2 "reasonably implies" the power to
select a deputy clerk. 2 6 In so construing the charter, the court
reasoned that it was proper to apply rules governing constitutional
construction such as determining the intent of the framers, and
that this result was consistent with the intention of the framers of
the city charter.2
II.

MUNICIPAL LIABILITY AND MUNICIPAL NOTICE STATUTES

Simmons v. City of Bluefield 8 was a personal injury action
brought against the city of Bluefield by the guardian of an infant
burned by a fire under the control of a city playground supervisor.
On appeal, the court agreed with the trial court's finding of negligence and liability on the part of the city, and, the court also
clarified several points urged as error by the defendant, two of
which concern local government.
First, a city ordinance making it unlawful to start a fire anywhere in the city without properly safeguarding it to prevent injury
to any person was held admissable as evidence. Although a prima
facie case of negligence is created by violation of a municipal ordinance, it is up to the jury to decide whether there was in fact a
violation and whether such violation was the proximate cause of
29
the injury.
2 The following case involving local government issues was not reported: In
re City of Charleston, 226 S.E.2d 900 (W. Va. 1976).
- 224 S.E.2d 902 (W. Va. 1976).
2 SOUTH CHARLESTON, W. VA., CHARMTR art. VII, § 7.3, provides in part: "The
Municipal Judge may appoint a clerk of the Municipal Court who shall serve at
the will and pleasure of the Municipal Judge and shall receive such compensation
as may be determined by the Council."
211 224 S.E.2d at 904.
22 Id. at 904.
- 225 S.E.2d 202 (W. Va. 1976). This case is also discussed in the section
entitled TORTS.
" 225 S.E.2d at 208, citing, e.g., Cross v. Noland, 190 S.E.2d 18 (W. Va. 1972).
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Secondly, a West Virginia statute provides that preceding a
suit against a city, there must be provided to that city a written
verified statement of the nature of the claim and its occurrence."'
The court held that written notice to the proper city authority,
although not technically verified, constituted substantial compliance with the statute if it afforded the city ample time to investigate the claim and formulate a defense.2'
III.

ASSESSMENT OF UTILITY PROPERTY

J 2
Petition of Hull
involved the determination of the proper
authority to assess a generating plant under construction and belonging to a public service corporation. The assessor of Grant
County, where the plant was located, entered the facility on his
land books. In response to a protest by the company, the assessor
certified the question of his authority to the State Tax Commissioner, who indicated that the authority to assess was exclusively
with the Board of Public Works. Upon petition by the assessor, the
Grant County Circuit Court ruled that, contrary to the Commissioner's instructions, the plant belonged on the county land books.

The authority to assess the "actual value of all property" of
public service corporations is specifically granted by statute to the
Board of Public Works.2 3 However, another statute provides that
Call real estate not used or occupied for purposes immediately
connected with the property" may be assessed by the proper
county authorities. The construction of the generating plant was
not sufficiently finished for it to be used; therefore, under state
law, it was personal property. 5 Yet, another statute specifically
grants power to the Board of Public Works to assess as personal
property the materials in construction work."
The court held that the statutes dealing with assessments
must be construed together and that personal property of a public
service corporation is assessable only by the Board of Public
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-12-20 (1977 Replacement Volume).
" 225 S.E.2d at 208, citing Higginbotham v. City of Charleston, 204 S.E.2d 1
(W. Va. 1974).
-2 222 S.E.2d 813 (W. Va. 1976).
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-6-1, 11 (1974 Replacement Volume).
2
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-6-24 (1974 Replacement Volume).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-4-11 (1974 Replacement Volume).
2" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-6-11 (1974 Replacement Volume).
"0 W.
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Works. Since the statute makes particular reference to real estate
conditionally assessable by county authorities, the court concluded
that personal property was not intended to be so assessed. Therefore, the ruling of the circuit court was reversed.27
III. LOCAL OPTION ELECTIONS ON DOG RACING
The only substantial question presented to the Court in Tri8 was the proper interState Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. Johnson,21
pretation of a local option election provision of the West Virginia
Racing Statute.29 In order for a county to hold a local option election on the question of a proposed dog or horse racetrack, a petition
signed by at least fifteen per cent of the "qualified voters" in the
county must be filed with the county commission. The issue was
the meaning of "qualified voters"-those actually voting or those
registered to vote. Since literally construing the words would require challenging every registered voter to determine whether his
franchise was legitimate in that county, the court held that the
legislative intent was to require a petition by fifteen per cent of
those persons who actually voted in the last election.4 0 The rule of
construction used was that statutes should be construed to give
effect to discerned legislative intent, which in this case was to
permit communities to express their preference regarding racing in
an election if a reasonable number of people requested a vote on
4
2

the issue.

IV.

MAXIMUM AGE
2 42

In Arritt v. Grisell,

RESTRICTIONS ON EMPLOYMENT

plaintiff, whose application for the posi-

tion of police officer in Moundsville was denied because he was
over thirty-five years of age, sought a mandatory injunction compelling defendants to hire him and pay damages. He alleged violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 196721 (the
ADEA) and of the Civil Rights Act, 244 in the statutory age limits
2 45
on hiring of municipal police officers in West Virginia.

2

222 S.E.2d at 816.

=1 230 S.E.2d 837 (W. Va. 1976).
2"
2,0

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 19-23-20 (1977 Replacement Volume).
230 S.E.2d at 839.

24 230 S.E.2d at 840.
212 421

F. Supp. 800 (1976).
29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621 et seq. (1975).
244 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1974).
2' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-12-14 (1977 Replacement Volume).
2,1
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Defendants contended that the job of police officer was covered by a provision found in the ADEA which allowed age restrictions where necessary to the normal operation of a particular business. 246 Evidence of the necessity of an age limitation on this particular job was presented in the form of an affidavit by the
Moundsville Chief of Police detailing the requirements of the job
and the physical skills which the affiant believed decline with age.
Although plaintiff contended that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain defendant's burden of proving the defense, the court, relying on an analogous case,27 found that "a minimal increase in risk
of harm to others is all that need be shown to justify the maximum
hiring age requirement here in issue." '48 Therefore, the claim based
on ADEA failed.
The second count of the complaint was that plaintiff was deprived of his right of equal protection of the law as guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment. A recent United States Supreme Court
case controlled the outcome of this issue. In Massachusetts Board
of Retirement v. Murgia,7' the plaintiff, an officer of the state
police, made a § 1983 challenge to the statute requiring his retirement at age fifty. Simply stated, the United States Supreme Court
found that the legislative classification required only examination
on a rational basis standard,20 which was easily satisfied by the
21 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(f) (1975).
247 Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974). In this case
the bona fide occupational qualification defense was successfully asserted regarding
the job of an inter-city bus driver. The reasoning was that the health and well-being
of passengers and other city motorists depended on the physical ability of the driver
to respond to the demands of his job.

21 421 F. Supp. at 803.

96 S.Ct. 2562 (1976).
m San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). This
case reaffirmed the principle that equal protection analysis requires strict scrutiny
of a legislative classification only when the classification impermissably interferes
with the exercise of a fundamental right, such as the right to vote, travel or speak
freely, or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class. A suspect class
is one burdened with disabilities and with a history of unequal treatment. 411 U.S.
at 28. Since mandatory retirement at age fifty from the Massachusetts State Police
involves neither situation, it is unnecessary to subject the legislative resolution to
that degree of critical examination that equal protection cases have called "strict
judicial scrutiny." The relatively relaxed standard of requiring a rational basis for
the classification is appropriate.
Justice Marshall dissented in Murgia, being of the opinion that the right to
work is a fundamental right and that older workers are subjected to repeated and
arbitrary discrimination in employment.
249
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need of the public for police in optimal physical condition. Therefore the reasoning in Murgia applied equally to a hiring age maximum of thirty-five, and plaintiff's claim for relief based on § 1983
was also rejected.
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE I
I.

INSTRUCTIONS

In Burdette v. Maust Coal & Coke Corp.,"' the court dealt
with the issue of inconsistent instructions. The defendant provided
an instruction about concurrent negligence that set up standards
different from those offered by plaintiffs instruction. The trial
court gave both instructions. The West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals, following an earlier West Virginia decision,ns held it error

"to give inconsistent instructions even if one of them states the law

correctly, in as much as the jury, in such circumstancees, is confronted with the task of determining which principal of law to
follow, and in as much as it is impossible for a court later to
determine upon what legal principle the verdict is founded." ''
Also in Burdette, a new trial was granted for all of the parties
in a situation involving multiple parties defendant. The court
found error in an instruction given by the trial court at the urging
of only one defendant. The court held that since the instruction
dealt with a theory of recovery used by the plaintiff against all of
the defendants, the plaintiffs case against the other defendants
was prejudiced by the giving of the instruction. Therefore, in the
interest of justice, a new trial was required as to all of the defendants since the rights involved in the case were so intermingled. 5
2' A case dealing with procedural issues that was not reported in this article
is: Hylton v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 226 S.E.2d 453 (W. Va. 1976) (trial
chancellors finding of facts).
2 222 S.E.2d 293 (W. Va. 1976). This case is also reported in the TORTS
section of the Survey.
m State Road Comm'n v. Darrah, 151 W. Va. 509, 153 S.E.2d 408 (1967). In
Darrahthe court also distinguished an inconsistent instruction from an incomplete
instruction. An incomplete instruction, as long as it is not binding, may be completed by another instruction while inconsistent instructions once given cannot be
corrected by another instruction.
2 222 S.E.2d at 298.
2 Id. at 299, citing Kord's Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. White, 14 Ariz. App. 294,
482 P.2d 903 (1971). In Kord's there was a complicated fact situation. An ambulance was forced to swerve into oncoming traffic to avoid an automobile which
entered a left turn bay in front of the ambulance. The trial court directed a verdict
for one of the parties. When this directed verdict was overturned a new trial was
ordered for all the parties since there may have been overlapping liabilities in a
complicated case.
The decision in Burdette is consistent with this rule. While the trial court in
Burdette was overturned on the basis that an erroneous (inconsistent) instruction
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This case poses an interesting question as to what a codefendant should do when another co-defendant requests a wrong
instruction on a theory applicable to both defendants. Following
Burdette, if he cannot convince the co-defendant to withdraw the
instruction, then he should object to the giving of the instruction.
However, if the instruction is given over his objection, it is doubtful
that the objection will prevent a new trial from being awarded if
the court finds that the giving of the instruction is reversible error.

II. RULE 12
In Toler v. Shelton,"' the plaintiff moved, pursuant to Rule
12(f) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, to strike as
insufficient some of the defenses asserted by State Farm Insurance, a co-defendant. In support of his motion to strike, the plaintiff filed affidavits and exhibits to show in what way the defenses
were insufficient. The trial court sustained the motion to strike
and entered an order striking the defenses challenged. On joint
motion of the parties the trial court certified seven questions to the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals relating to the defenses
asserted by the defendant.
The certified questions were not properly before the court for
two reasons. First, the court, following earlier decisions,257 held
that because there had been substantial factual inquiry concerning
the defenses, certification was not possible because the function of
certification is "to examine the facial sufficiency of a pleading"' 5
independent of underlying facts.
Second, the court found that when factual material accompanies a motion to strike under Rule 12(f), the motion may be considered a motion for partial summary judgment."' Since this was a
motion for partial summary judgment, certification was not available under the statute260 because the motion for partial summary
judgment was not denied. The court recognized in Toler that some
was given, in Burdette, as in Kord's, there was also the possibility of overlapping
liabilities and the case involved numerous defendants that could be found jointly
or severally liable.
211223 S.E.2d 429 (W. Va. 1976).
2" Id. at 432, citing, e.g., State v. Miller, 145 W. Va. 59, 112 S.E.2d 472 (1960);
Sage v. Boyd, 145 W. Va. 197, 113 S.E.2d 836 (1960).
211 223 S.E.2d at 432.
2' Id. at 433.
2" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-5-2 (Cum.Supp. 1976).
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authority had held that matters outside the pleadings could not be
introduced to support a motion to strike under Rule 12(f). 6'' However, the court seemed to follow a line of decisions that turn a
motion to strike under Rule 12(f) into a motion for partial summary judgment under Rule 56 when factual matter is presented in
6 2 This is
support of the motion.1
similar to the provisions of the
West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure that turn a motion to dismiss on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) into a motion for summary
judgment under Rule 56 when matters outside the pleadings accompany the motion.
III.

RULE 14 IMPLEADER

Southern Erectors,Inc. v. Olga Coal Co.,2

3

involved a suit by

a subcontractor to enforce a mechanic's lien against the property
owner. The property owner impleaded the contractor as a thirdparty defendant under Rule 14. The issue was whether the thirdparty defendant had standing to appeal the ruling of the trial court
on defenses he asserted on behalf of the third-party plaintiff (or the
original defendant).
The power of a third-party defendant to assert the defenses
available to a third-party plaintiff stems from Rule 14 of the West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure.2 4 This provision is contained
within the rules to protect a third-party defendant when a thirdparty plaintiff fails to assert a proper defense.2 65 The court, noting
that the third-party defendant's liability arises from an adjudication against the third-party plaintiff, held that a third-party defendant had standing to appeal the ruling of the trial court on defenses asserted by the third-party defendant on behalf of the thirdparty plaintiff under Rule 14.216
266 223

AND

S.E.2d at 433, citing, e.g., 5 C.
PROCEDURE § 1380 (1969).

WRIGHT & A. MILLER FEDERAL PRACrIcE

22 Brown v. Bridgeport Rolling Mills Co., 245 F. Supp. 41 (D.C. Conn. 1965);
Ciprari v. Servicos Aereos Cruzeiro 245 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
263 223 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1976). This case is also reported in this section under
RULE 56, and also under the heading PROPERTY.
21 W. VA. R. CIr. P. 14.
26 223 S.E.2d at 49.
26 Id. at 50. Any other decision by the court would be totally unfair. In thirdparty cases, many times the original defendant will have no interest in appealing
decisions on his defenses because he will not be paying any part of the judgment
because the third-party defendant is liable to him. This would not be true where

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol79/iss3/8

52

et al.: Survey of Developments in West Virginia Law: 1976
SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENTS

IV. RULE 50
In Simmons v. City of Bluefield,17 the appellee City of Bluefield filed cross-assignments of error dealing with the trial court's
failure to direct a verdict in its favor. While the appellee had filed
for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the evidence, appellee
had not complied with Rule 50(b) of the West Virginia Rules of
Civil Procedure, which permits a party to file for a motion notwithstanding the verdict within ten days of entry of judgment.268 The
appellants contended that since the appellee had not complied
with the provisions of 50(b), they could not cross-assign as error
any matter connected with their motion for a directed verdict.
The court answered this by stating that a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is not a condition precedent for
a cross-assignment of error. 69 However, in the absence of a motion
for directed verdict or judgment under Rule p0, "[t]his Court will
not direct the entry of judgment for a complaining party." 7 ' Therefore, the failure to make a motion under Rule 50(b) does not preclude an appeal, but such failure limits the scope of the appeal and
the relief which may be granted. 7'

V. RULE 52
Prete v. MerchantsPropertyInsuranceCo. of Indiana,72 dealt
with the failure of the trial court to follow the provisions of Rule
52(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 52(a)
provides that in an action tried without a jury, the trial judge must
find "the facts specially and state separately his conclusion of law
the third-party defendant is liable for only part of the claim, because then the
original defendant would be paying part of the judgment against him. Even in this
situation, though, it is best to allow the third-party defendant to appeal; otherwise,
you run into the question of how much of an interest does a third-party defendant
have to have before he can appeal on the basis of defenses of the original defendant.
26? 225 S.E.2d 202 (W. Va. 1976). This case is also reported under the heading
TORTS.
M"5A MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 50.16 (2d ed. 1975); 9 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2540 (1971).

"1g225 S.E.2d at 207.
270 Id.
21, Id. This holding indicates that unless a party on appeal has moved for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the court will not enter judgment for that
party but will remand the case to the lower court.
'2 223 S.E.2d 441 (W. Va. 1976). This case is also reported under the heading
of TORTS.
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thereon." 31 The trial court had included in its final order the facts
and conclusions but had failed to designate them separately. The
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that where there is
sufficient information in the record as to the operative facts, the
issue could be disposed of on appeal without remanding the case
for compliance with Rule 52(a).
This case continues the West Virginia interpretation of Rule
52(a), that despite the mandatory language of the rule that requires a separation of the findings of facts and legal conclusions,
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals will not reverse
merely because the separation was not made.
VI. RULE 56
A.

Affidavits

Akers7 4

Hamon v.
involved the failure of an opposing party to
file affidavits when a motion for summary judgment was made.
The appellate court looked at the moving party's affidavit in support of the motion for summary judgment and found it to be convincing in the absence of a counter-affidavit that there were no
genuine issues of fact. The summary judgment of the lower court
was affirmed. This case reiterates the importance of filing counteraffidavits when affidavits are filed in support of a motion for summary judgment.
B.

Third-PartyActions

In Southern Erectors, Inc. v. Olga Coal Co.,"' a third-party
defendant was joined by the defendant/third-party plaintiff. In the
court's order on a motion for summary judgment by the plaintiff
against the defendant/third-party plaintiff, the defendant was ordered to pay a sum to the plaintiff and to credit this amount
against the sum owed to the third-party defendant. The court
found that this order amounted to a summary judgment against
the third-party defendant who was not a party to the motion for
summary judgment.
Examining whether this was proper, the court held that
2

RULE

W. VA. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
222 S.E.2d 822 (W. Va. 1976).
' 223 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1976). This case is also reported in this section under
14, and also in the section entitled TORTS.
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"where a court acts with great caution, assuring itself that the
parties to be bound by its judgment have had an adequate opportunity to develop all of the probative facts which relate to their
respective claims, the court may grant summary judgment sua
sponte." 2" The court then found that the probative facts were on
record because the rights of the third-party plaintiff and thirdparty defendant were based on a contract which was before the
court.
VII.

SUPREME COURT RULES

In Benson v. Robertson,17 the respondents to a petition for
mandamus failed to file the responsive pleading required under the
rules of practice in the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals."'
As a result of this failure to file, the court accepted as true all
material and undenied allegations of the petition for mandamus.
The court emphasized the risks one takes when, in the original
jurisdiction area of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals,
one fails to comply with Rule XVIII.2 "
This decision equivocates a failure to respond under Rule
XVIII of the Rules of Practice in the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals with a failure to respond under Rule 8 of the West
Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. In both instances, the failure to
respond is deemed to be an admission.
VIII.

VERDICT

s°

In King v. Bittingern the court decided whether a verdict
should be overturned because it was inadequate. In an action for
27 Id. at 51, citing Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Wirtz v. Young Electric Sign Co., 315 F.2d 326 (10th Cir. 1963). Contra, Twin
City Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 491 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1974).
The reason for this split is that some courts require strict adherence to Rule 56 while
other courts will allow the judge to enter a summary judgment without a motion if
it is clearly and obviously a case for summary judgment.
-7 226 S.E.2d 447 (W. Va. 1976).
279 W. VA. Sup. CT. R. XVIII, § 4, provides in part: "Within ten days after the
issuance of a writ or rule, but in any event at least three days before the return day
for the writ or rule applied for, the respondent shall file with the clerk of this court
a responsive pleading." This case is the first interpretation of this section of the

rule.

' Id. at 450. From this warning given by the court it is essential that the
mandate of Rule XVIII be followed in original jurisdiction actions.
'o

231 S.E.2d 239 (W. Va. 1976).
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damages caused by the defendant's negligence, the jury returned
a verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $547.86, the amount of the
stipulated medical expenses. There was uncontroverted evidence
that the plaintiff missed about fifty days of work which resulted
in a loss of earnings of $3009.00. Also, there was evidence that the
plaintiff had suffered an injury which resulted in pain and suffering. The plaintiff had moved the trial court for a new trial and the
trial court had refused the motion. The denial of the motion for a
new trial was then appealed to the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals.
The defendant relied on the "perversely stated verdict" rule
to justify the action of the trial court in denying the motion for a
new trial. The "perversely stated verdict" rule applies if: (1) there
is a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff for a nominal amount and
(2) the evidence is so inadequate that if the jury had returned a
verdict for the defendant the trial court could not set it aside.2",
This verdict is said to be perversely expressed because the jury
only finds nominally for the plaintiff while in reality the jury has
found for the defendant.
The King court, however, would not apply this rule because
the proof of contributory negligence was so weak that the second
part of the test for a "perversely stated verdict" was not met. The
trial court could in this case have set aside a verdict for the defendant; because here, the record adequately established the liability
of the defendant. Since the "perversely stated verdict" rule did not
apply, the court relied on Hall v. Groves28 and held that if "a
verdict does not include elements of damages which are specifically proved in uncontroverted amounts and a substantial amount
as compensation for injuries and the consequent pain and suffering, the verdict is inadequate and will be set aside." '83
A second issue in King was whether the new trial should be
on all the issues or whether the new trial should just be on the issue
of damages. The court listed three conditions for when a new trial
could be limited just to a determination of damages. These three
conditions are: (1) the issue of damages is separate and distinct
from the issue of liability; (2) the liability of the defendant is
211 Shields v. Church Bros., Inc., 193 S.E.2d 151 (W. Va. 1972); Coakley v.
Marple, 152 W. Va. 68, 159 S.E.2d 378 (1968).
212 151 W. Va. 449, 153 S.E.2d 165 (1967).
" 231 S.E.2d at 243.
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definitely established; and (3) the limitation will not operate to the
prejudice of the defendant.24 The court seized upon the second
condition and held that since it would allow a contributory negligence instruction to go to the jury, the liability of the defendant
was not definitely established and thus a new trial on all the issues
should be held.
This holding of a new trial on all the issues is hard to justify.
In not applying the "perversely expressed verdict" rule the court
indicated that the defendant's evidence was so weak that a finding
by the jury in favor of the defendant would be set aside. However,
when it came to the nature of the new trial the court held that,
since it would allow an instruction on contributory negligence, the
liability of the defendant was not definitely established. These two
positions are inconsistent and would seem to eliminate the possibility of a new trial solely on the issue of damages whenever a new
trial is sought because the verdict is inadequate. If the test to
determine whether a defendant's liability is definitely established
is whether an instruction can be given, a new trial limited to damages would not be possible wherever there is slight evidence to
sustain the giving of a defendant's instruction, something that will
be present in almost every case.
21

Shields v. Church Bros., Inc., 193 S.E.2d 151 (W. Va. 1972).
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PROPERTY
I. ESTATES

In Farrarv. Young,"' the plaintiff (Young) individually and
as administratrix of her deceased father's estate brought suit
against her co-administrators (her brothers), in their individual
and official capacities, for an accounting and recovery of certain
monies paid to her brothers under a lease agreement. The defendants (Farrar) counter-claimed, alleging she had received an advance against her share of the estate and that, in any division of
the estate, her share must be decreased accordingly. The defendants also contended that the royalty agreement upon which plaintiff based her claim was invalid and inoperative. The trial court
decided: (1) that money was due the estate because of the binding
force of the royalty agreement; (2) that plaintiff had received a one
thousand dollar advance against her share; (3) that the proceeds
in certain joint bank accounts opened by plaintiff and her father
be paid into the estate; and (4) that no attorney's fees were to be
charged to the estate. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part.
The royalty agreement plaintiff based her claim on was entered into in April of 1965. In that agreement she and her brothers
(defendants), in consideration of the conveyance of certain property, agreed to pay their father a royalty payment for the removal
of minerals from beneath this land. In May of 1965, the father
granted to the defendants the tract of land covered by the royalty
agreement. The conveyance was made by general warranty deed
and contained no reference to the royalty agreement. The royalty
agreement was not recorded before the grant; so as to a bona fide
purchaser of the subject land, the agreement would be nullified.,"
However, the grantees had actual notice of the agreement (being
parties to it) and the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
noted that they could not invoke the provisions of the recording act
to protect themselves. Since the agreement was never cancelled or
released, the defendants were ordered to pay the estate a portion
vRs230 S.E.2d 261 (W. Va. 1976).
shall be void, as to
20 "[Elvery deed conveying any such estate or term, ..
• . .subsequent purchasers. . . without notice. . . until and except from the time
that it is duly admitted to record in the county wherein the property. . may be."
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 40-1-9 (1966).
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of the payments they had received from a quarry operation leasing
the property in question.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found that the
money in the joint bank accounts was the sole property of the
plaintiff. A teller had testified to the competency of the deceased,
his intention to create a joint account with the proceeds to go to
the survivor, and also that the plaintiff had paid her share into the
accounts. Absent fraud or mistake, it is conclusively presumed
that the donor-depositor of a joint and survivorship bank account
intended a causa mortis gift of the proceeds remaining intact after
death to the survivor."' The court also noted that since both the
plaintiff and the defendants had brought suit, defended and counterclaimed both as administrators and as individuals, those portions of the attorney's fees properly attributable to capturing assets of the estate could be charged to the estate.m
II.

MECHANIC's LIEN

The controversy in Southern Erectors,Inc. v. Olga Coal Co.2
arose from a series of contracts entered into in order to improve a
mine. The Olga Coal Company (Olga) owned and operated a coal
tipple on land owned by corporate subsidiaries of the Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Company. In 1969 and 1970, Olga contracted with
American Air Filter Company (American) to build a dust control
on the tipple. American entered into a subcontract with Associated
Craftsmen (Associated) for labor and materials. Associated then
entered into a subcontract with Southern Erectors for men and
materials to be used on the system.
Associated defaulted on its obligation to Southern Erectors.
To secure complete payment, Southern Erectors served notice on
Olga and filed notice of a mechanic's lien on the tipple and the
land. Olga was permitted to file a third-party complaint against
American, in which Olga contended that American had agreed to
indemnify Olga against all claims made against Olga by a subcontractor. American denied the existence of this provision. The Circuit Court of McDowell County found that Southern Erector had
- W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31A-4-33 (1975 Replacement Volume); Wilkes v. Summerfield, 212 S.E.2d 316 (W. Va. 1975); Dorsey v. Short, 205 S.E.2d 687, (W. Va.
1974).
2m 230 S.E.2d at 267.
21 223 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1976).
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an enforceable mechanic's lien against Olga and that Olga was
entitled to a setoff in the amount of that lien from American. The
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's
decision.
The appellant American challenged the effectiveness of the
mechanic's lien. Under the governing provisions of the West Virginia Code, a subcontractor has a claim upon a structure improved
by his labor and materials. 9 ' He must have given notice of his
claim within sixty days of contract completion."0 ' Notice was
served on Olga, but a factual dispute as to the last date of work
was dismissed by the court as unimportant. The applicable statutory provision required notice only to the owner of the structure
and not to the owner of the property.292 Proper notice was given.
The lower court granted a summary judgment against American even though Olga had made no such motion. In reviewing
statutory authority and case decision applicable to the summary
judgment procedure," 3 the court decided that a lower court may
grant summary judgment on its own motion if it acts with great
caution after hearing all the facts. 94
The agreement between the parties was set out in a series of
documents. American agreed to furnish the improvements. Where
a contractor has obligated itself to furnish labor and materials, in
the absence of language otherwise stating, compensation is borne
by the contractor. The owner was entitled to a setoff for any expenses incurred by reason of the contractor's failure to perform. 93 Olga
was entitled to such a setoff to recompense it for the expenses of
the lien.
W. VA. CODE ANN.
W. VA. CODE ANN.
292 W. VA. CODE ANN.
2

2"

§ 38-2-2 (1966).
§ 38-2-7 (1966).
§ 38-2-9 (1966).

21 The applicable rule of civil procedure provides that a summary judgment
may be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. W. VA. R. Civ. P. 56. The opponent to
such a motion may be granted a summary judgment by the court even though he
has made no cross motion. Lowenschuss v. Kane, 520 F.2d 255 (2nd Cir. 1975).
" 223 S.E.2d at 51, citing Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson, 160 U.S. App.
D.C. 14, 488 F.2d 1338 (1973).
- Carruth v. Valley Ready Mix Concrete Co., 221 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949); H.T.C. Corporation v. Olds, 486 P.2d 463 (Colo. App. 1971); 17A C.J.S.

CoNTRACTs

§ 368

(1963).
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III.

NEGATIVE EASEMENT

In Bennett v. Charles Corp.,9 ' the plaintiffs attempted to
claim the benefits of a negative easement. A negative easement is
one in which the owner of the servient (lesser) estate is prohibited
otherwise lawful, because it will affect the
from doing something,
297
dominant estate.
Factually, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants, owners of the tract of land, from developing a cemetery within the
tract. Plaintiffs owned a home situated within the tract. They
contended that the oral promise of the defendants that the land
would be developed as a residential area was sufficient to operate
as a negative easement and that, in any case, a clause in the will
of the original owner forbade the development of a cemetery within
the tract.
The first question before the court was whether the circumstances surrounding the sale to the plaintiff created a negative
easement upon the property. An easement was defined by the
court as a subdivision of real property and, as such, subject to
legislative provisions governing estates in land29 including subjection to the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, which mandates
that the creation of estates in land be in writing. 99 Only the will
of the original owner was regarded as a "writing" sufficient to
create an easement.
The court looked to the purpose of the Statute of Frauds,
which is the prevention of actual fraud and perjury. Persons are
estopped from pleading the Statute of Frauds as a defense only in
the limited circumstances of actual fraud on the part of the vendor
and/or part performance on the part of the vendee.2 " Fraud was
held not to be present in this case, and the alleged oral promise of
the defendants-vendors was inoperative as a negative easement.
In determining whether the restrictive clause in the will operated for the plaintiffs benefit, the court held that it was operative
only as a personal restriction upon the devisees which conferred no
-3 226 S.E.2d 559 (W. Va. 1976).
"' BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 600 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
28 W. VA. CODE AN. § 36-1-1 (Cum. Supp. 1976); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-1-3
(1966); Cottrell v. Nurnberger, 131 W. Va. 391, 397, 47 S.E.2d 454, 457 (1948).
22 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-1-3 (1966).
Smith v. Morton, 70 Okla. 157, 173 P. 520 (1918).
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rights upon any successor in title. It was noted that it was not for
a court of equity to enforce a restriction against subsequent purchasers which was personal to the grantor.3"'
IV.

RESERVATIONS

In the action of West Virginia Department of Highways v.
3 2
Farmer,
the Department of Highways instigated an eminent
domain proceeding for sand and gravel contained on land owned
by defendants. The owners of nine-tenths of the mineral rights
intervened and contended that the reservation of "oil, gas and
other minerals" contained in the original deed applied to sand and
gravel. They asked for nine-tenths of the award which had been
granted to the surface owners.
The issue was whether the reservation had indeed included
the sand and gravel. Sand and gravel are normally considered to
be minerals.3 3 Minerals include every stone and rock deposit regardless of metallic content. 4 The deed language reserved "oil, gas
and other minerals." This language introduced an ambiguity into
the deed. Where a deed is unambiguous, there is no need for construction and words are given their usual meaning. Where ambiguous language is injected, construction becomes necessary and circumstances attendant to the making of the deed are to be considered. 05
When the land was originally sold in 1911 there was no evidence of any prior sale of sand, or evidence that the grantor even
knew of the existence of the sand. Therefore, the court held that
the sand was not included in the reservation. The words "and other
minerals" were construed by the application of the rule of ejusdem
generis-where general words follow specific words, the general
words are limited to the same kind or class as the specific. 0 "And
other minerals" included only petroleum minerals, not sand and
gravel.
- Cole v. Seamonds, 87 W. Va. 19, 104 S.E. 747 (1920).
226 S.E.2d 717 (W. Va. 1976).
- Waugh v. Thomsom Land & Coal Co., 103 W. Va. 567, 137 S.E. 895 (1927).
"
Robinson v. Wheeling Steel & Iron Co., 99 W. Va. 435, 129 S.E. 311 (1925).
Burdette v. Bruen, 118 W. Va. 624, 191 S.E. 360 (1937).
Bischoff v. Francesca, 133 W. Va. 474, 56 S.E.2d 865 (1949).
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V.

SUING BENEFICIARY

In Fitzwaterv. Dobson,317 an alleged creditor of the decedent's
estate failed to present a timely claim against either the Commissioner of Accounts or decedent's personal representative. Rather,
the alleged creditor instituted an action against the widow in her
capacity as a beneficiary of the estate. The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals held that the lower court had improperly dismissed as untimely the creditor's claim.
The plaintiff had been an employee of the decedent and alleged that an agreement had been made that he be paid $1.45 per
hour for his services as a television repairman. A subsequent agreement raised his salary to $1.60 per hour. The plaintiff contended,
however, that the full amount was never paid though the deceased
had reassured the plaintiff of payment. The employment was terminated sometime before the death of the employer.
The Commissioner of Accounts disallowed the claim as being
untimely, despite the plaintiff's contention that he could recover
by virtue of a state statute which provides that one alleging a claim
not barred by the statute of limitations may bring his action
against the legatees jointly or severally within two years of the
death, if the claim is not against the Commissioner of Accounts
or the personal representative."' The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs claim against a beneficiary was timely and should have been allowed.
VI.

TRESPASS

In Bailey v. S. J. Groves & Sons, Co.,3 " an owner of real estate
attempted to recover damages in trespass for flooding caused by
defendant's construction of a state highway. By the terms of defendant's contract with the state, the construction company was to
build (and did build) the highway in accordance with strict specifications established by the Department of Highways. The contractor followed the specifications to the letter and water was forced
upon the plaintiffs land causing substantial damage. In the Circuit Court of Mercer County both parties moved for a summary
- 226 S.E.2d 45 (W. Va. 1976).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-2-7 (1966).

3

230 S.E.2d 267 (W. Va. 1976).
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judgment, stipulating that there was no question as to any material fact. Summary judgment was granted to the plaintiff with
damages in the amount of four thousand dollars. The plaintiff
proceeded on the theory of strict liability for trespass without alleging any malicious intent or negligence upon the part of the defendant contractor and without asserting that defendant was engaging in any ultrahazardous activity.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that although strict liability for trespass was the common law rule, that
absolute standard was no longer applicable. The tort of trespass
now encompasses only intentional or malicious intrusion upon the
land of another, or an inadvertent intrusion upon another's property caused by the trespasser's ultrahazardous activity." ' The
court noted that for an independent contractor building a road
under a state contract to be liable in trespass for property damage,
it must have independently and negligently committed the trespass, unless engaged in an ultrahazardous activity." Therefore, as
the contractor in this case committed no independent wrong, it
could not be liable in trespass to the plaintiff and the lower ruling
was reversed.
VII.

TRUSTS

The question before the court in Rogerson v. Wheeling Dollar
Savings & Trust Co.,"t 2 involved the proper time for distribution
of the corpus of a trust. Thomas Rogerson died testate in 1952. His
will provided that his entire estate be put in trust with distribution
of the corpus to come fifteen years after the death of the last life
beneficiary. During that time the defendant-trustees were to manage the trust. The last such beneficiary died in 1966, so distribution was to be deferred until 1981. The testator's nephew sought
immediate distribution of the principal and accumulated income.
The nephew contended that the trust was dry or passive because
of the deaths of the life beneficiaries and the dissolution of two
businesses which contained most of the trust assets, and whose
management was incumbent upon the trustees.
30 Elk Garden Big Vein Mining Co. v. Gerstell, 100 W. Va. 472, 131 S.E. 152
(1925); W. Prosser, Tors § 13 (4th ed. 1971).
I"
E.g., Perdue v. S. J. Groves & Sons Co., 152 W. Va. 222, 161 S.E.2d 250
(1968); Whitney v. Myers Corp., 146 W. Va. 130, 118 S.E.2d 622 (1961).
311222 S.E.2d 816 (W. Va. 1976).
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A trust is passive when the active duties imposed on the trustee have been fully performed; at this time, the Statute of Uses
executes the trust and converts the beneficiaries' equitable title
into legal title.31 3 In this case, the trustees had the power to manage, lease, and convey with discretion the trust assets. The companies were dissolved, but only half of the trust assets were the stock
of those corporations. The other half of the trust assets were stocks,
bonds, and real estate producing rent and income. Thus, the trustees had a continuing duty to manage the remaining assets of the
trust.
Another issue involved the proper time for the distribution of
the trust income which the trustees had accumulated since the
trust's creation. In the absence of a statute, a provision in a will
for the accumulation of income within the period of the Rule
Against Perpetuities is valid.31 1 The decedent's will, however, contained no such provision. Thus, following a Restatement preference against accumulation in the absence of express language, the
court held that the trust income accumulated from the date of
death 5of the last life beneficiary should be distributed immedi31
ately.

There was also a question as to whom the beneficiaries were.
The testator used the words "children and issue." Technically, the
term children includes only lineal issue of the first degree. 31 Where
another meaning is apparent, though, courts have generally held
that the technical meaning will not be applied. 317 With no indication that the testator intended to differentiate among his siblings'
issue, the court held that testator had used the words children and
issue interchangeably and not technically.
VIII.

WAY OF NECESSITY

In Berkeley Development Corp. v. Hutzler,3 1 one owner of a
§ 36-1-17 (1966).
A. W. Scorr, Trusts § 62.11 (3rd. ed. 1967).

"' W. VA. CODE ANN.

31

M,222 S.E.2d at 820. The generally accepted reason for the preference against
accumulation is the idea that the one who owns the property, though it may be
managed by a trustee, should have the benefits and profits of ownership.
RESTATEMENT oF THE LAW, PROPERTY §

440 (1952).

The term "children," in the absence of the qualifying words and provisions,
means issue of the first degree. Davis Trust Co. v. Elkins, 114 W. Va. 742, 175 S.E.
611 (1939).
31 Weiss v. Soto, 142 W. Va. 783, 98 S.E.2d 727 (1957).
319 229 S.E.2d 73 (W. Va. 1976).
31
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tract sought an injunction prohibiting the owner of an adjacent
tract from entering into and interfering with the surface of plaintiff's tract. The lower court decided that defendant had neither a
prescriptive easement nor a way of necessity across plaintiff's
tract, and granted the injunction. The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the defendant had a prescriptive easement.
The facts revealed that the two tracts had once been held by
a common owner. It was stipulated that there were no express
easements in either of the parties' chain of title. A roadway existed
over the plaintiffs property and defendant's uncontradicted testimony was that the road had been in continuous use for seventy
years. Defendant also testified that there was no means of ingress
and egress appurtenant to the property other than this roadway
extending over plaintiffs property.
A unanimous court held that the defendant had a way of
necessity over the adjoining tract. To have a way of necessity, the
tracts at one time must have been held by common owner; the
creation of a way of necessity depends upon the need for an easement over the lands of the grantor (or his successors in title) in
order for the grantee (or his successors in title) to have a means of
ingress and egress to his property and to obtain the full use of his
property." 9 A way of necessity having been created by implication,
it cannot be extinguished until the necessity ceases, regardless of
whether the purchaser of the dominant estate has notice of the way
of necessity or not.32
"I Dewitt v. Elmore, 112 W. Va. 617, 166 S.E. 271 (1932).
3" Crotty v. Coal Co., 72 W. Va. 68, 78 S.E. 233 (1913).
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TAXATION
I.

STATE INHERITANCE AND TRANSFER TAX

Three sections of Chapter eleven, Article eleven of the West
Virginia Code dealing with inheritance and transfer taxes were
amended and a new section added by the West Virginia Legislature in 1976.
Section one, which states when the transfer tax is imposed,
was amended in two major areas. The first amended area deals
with powers of appointment. 2 ' Paragraph (e)3"2 of the amended
section deals with the creation of either a general or special power
whereby the person to whom the power is given (hereinafter called
the donee) has also been given an estate in the property subject to
the power. Previously, if a power coupled with an estate in the
property was given, the amount of the property which was subject
to the tax was limited to the value of the estate.an Now, under
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-11-1 (Cum. Supp. 1976) provides in part:
A tax, payable into the treasury of the State, shall be imposed upon
the transfer, in trust, or otherwise of any property, or interest therein,
real, personal, or mixed, if such transfer be:
(e) To any person deriving an estate in property coupled with a
general or limited power of appointment.
(1) General power.-Any transfer involving the creation of a general power of appointment shall be treated as transferring to the donee
of the power a fee or equivalent interest in the property which is subject
to the power.
(2) Limited power.-Any transfer involving the creation of any
other power of appointment shall be treated as transferring to the donee
of the power a life estate or term of years in the property which is subject
to the power and as transferring remainder or reversionary interests
therein to those who would take if the power is not exercised. The portion
of tax which is imposed on any person entitled in remainder or reversion
shall be payable in the same manner, and within the same time, as if such
person's interest had vested in possession. Unless otherwise provided by
the decedent, the tax on such temporary interests and on such remainder
or reversionary interests shall be payable out of the corpus of the property
which is subject to the power.
12 While the language in paragraph (e) is broad enough to cover inter vivos
transfers as well as death transfers, the intent of the legislature in the state
inheritance and transfer tax is to tax transfers taking place at the decedent's death.
Also, there is no gift tax in West Virginia, which is what a reading of this provision
as taxing lifetime transfers of powers would entail.
2 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-11-1 (1974 Replacement Volume). This means that
if the donee received a life estate and a power to appoint, the tax was computed
only on the value of his life estate.
2
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amended paragraph (e) of § 11-11-1 the property which is subject
to the tax is greatly expanded. If the donee is given an estate in
the property coupled with a general power, for purposes of the tax
the donee is treated as if he received a fee simple. If the donee
derives an estate in the property coupled with a limited power, the
donee is treated as if he received a life estate or term of years in
the property and the takers in default (those to whom the property
goes if the limited power is not exercised) are treated as if they
received a remainder or reversionary interest. For the purposes of
the tax the remainder or reversionary interest is treated as if it
were a vested interest with the portion of tax allocated to it being
payable at the same time as the donee's portion. Since the donee's
portion of the tax is payable immediately, this has the effect of
accelerating the tax payable by the takers-in-default. In the limited power situation, subparagraph (e)(2) also provides that the
tax is payable out of the corpus of the property subject to the power
unless the decedent provides otherwise.
Paragraph (f)324 of the amended section deals with the exercise
n' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-11-1 (CuM. Supp. 1976) provides in part:
A tax, payable into the treasury of the State, shall be imposed upon
the transfer, in trust, or otherwise of any property, or interest therein,
real, personal, or mixed, if such transfer be:
(f) By the exercise or nonexercise of a general power of appointment.
(1) Power that remains unexercised at time of death.-If at the
time of his death a decedent has a general power of appointment with
respect to property, the exercise of that power is subject to tax as a
transfer of the property from the decedent to the person to whom the
property is appointed. The failure of the decedent to exercise a general
power of appointment is subject to tax as a transfer of the property from
the decedent to the person to whom the property passes by virtue of the
nonexercise of the power. For purposes of this paragraph the power of
appointment shall be considered to exist on the date of the decedent's
death even though the exercise of that power is subject to a precedent
giving of notice or even though the exercise of the power takes effect only
on the expiration of a stated period after its exercise, whether or not on
or before the date of the decedent's death, notice has been given or the
power has been exercised.
(2) Exercise or release by decedent of power during his
lifetime.-The exercise or release by the decedent during his lifetime of
a general power of appointment is a transfer subject to tax if the exercise
or release is of such a nature that if it were a transfer of property owned
by the decedent, such transfer would be subject to tax under this article.
A disclaimer or renunciation of such a power of appointment shall not be
deemed a release of such power.
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or nonexercise of a general power of appointment. Subparagraph
(f)(1) provides for the exercise or nonexercise of a general power at
the time of death of the holder of the power. If a decedent has a
general power of appointment at his death and he exercises it, the
exercise of the power is deemed a taxable transfer from the decedent to the person to whom the property is appointed. If the decedent has a general power at the time of his death but fails to
exercise the power, there is deemed to be a taxable transfer from
the decedent to whomever the property passes because of the failure of the decedent to appoint.3 Subparagraph (f) (1) also provides
that the decedent is still considered to have the power at the date
of his death even if the exercise of the power is subject to a giving
of notice or even though the exercise takes effect only on the expiration of a stated period after its exercise. This measure is designed
to prevent loopholes caused by the taxing of powers not exercised
at the donee's death.
Subparagraph (f)(2) deals with the exercise or release of a
general power during the decedent's lifetime. It provides that an
exercise or release of a power during the decedent's lifetime is
taxable only if it comes under some other provision of the article
which makes it taxable. The main provision to watch for here is
gifts in contemplation of death. 2 Subparagraph (f)(2) also provides that a disclaimer or renunciation of a power of appointment
is not a release. This means that neither a disclaimer nor a renunciation of a power would be taxable. Subparagraph (f)(3) adopts
the same definitions of general power of appointment and lapse of
power as the Internal Revenue CodeA7
(3) Definition.-Forpurposes of subdivisions (e) and (f), the term
"general power of appointment" and the term "lapse of power" shall have
the same meaning as when used in section 2041 of the Internal Revenue

Code.
3,,

Id.

§ 11-1-1(c) (Cum. Supp. 1976). Since there is no state
tax on lifetime transfers, a gift in contemplation of death would be the only section
that could apply. If the gift is made within three years of death, it is presumed to
be a gift in contemplation of death.
I" The Internal Revenue Code defines a general power of appointment as "a
power which is exercisable in favor of the decedent, his estate, his creditors, or the
creditors of the estate." INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2041. A few exceptions to this
definition are also present in § 2041. This section equates a lapse with a release of
a power except to the extent of the greater of (a) $5000 or (b) 5% of the aggregate
value of the property subject to the power of appointment. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2041(b)(2).
3' W. VA. CODE ANN.
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The second major area of change in § 11-11-1 was designed to
put the state treatment of annuity or investment contracts in line
with the federal estate tax provisions as to the type of annuity and
investment contracts that are given a tax break.328 Certain exceptions were added to paragraph (g) to accomplish this objective.
There will no longer be a state inheritance tax on any portion of
annuity contracts that fall into the five classes defined in § 11-111. Before, these annuity contracts had been fully taxable, and
remain taxable under the federal estate tax, to the extent of employee contributions. This means that the state inheritance tax is
more lenient in regard to these types of annuities than the federal
estate tax. It is interesting to note that subsequent to the adoption
of this amendment conforming the state treatment of annuity contracts with the federal treatment, Congress passed amendments to
the federal treatment of annuities that expanded the number of
exemptions.3 2 This may mean that another change may be forthcoming in the state's treatment of annuity contracts.
3 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-11-1(g) (Cum. Supp. 1976) provides in part:
Notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, there

shall be exempt from tax hereunder the proceeds of an annuity or other
payment, whether attributable to employer contribution, employee contribution or otherwise, receivable by any beneficiary under:
(1) An employee's trust (or under a contract purchased by an employee's trust) forming part of a pension, stock bonus, or profit-sharing
plan, including self-employed plans, which, at the time of the decedent's
separation from employment (whether by death or otherwise), or at the
time of termination of the plan if earlier, met the requirements of section
401 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code;
(2) A retirement annuity contract purchased by an employer (and
not by an employee's trust) pursuant to a plan which, at the time of
decedent's separation from employment (by death or otherwise), or at the
time of termination of the plan if earlier, was a plan described in section

403(a) of the Internal Revenue Code;
(3) A retirement annuity contract purchased for an employee by an
employer which is an organization referred to in section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii)
or (vi) of the Internal Revenue Code, or which is a religious organization
(other than a trust), and which is exempt from tax under section 501(a)
of the Internal Revenue Code;
(4) Annuity under the Retired Serviceman's Family Protection
Plan or Survivor Benefit Plan pursuant to chapter 73 of Title 10 of the
United States Code;
(5) A retirement savings plan for which a deduction has been allowed under section 219 of the Internal Revenue Code.
321INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 2039, as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
The additional exclusions granted for the federal estate tax dealt with individual
retirement accounts.
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Changes were also made in § 11-11-4, which lists the exemptions to the state inheritance and transfer taxes. Most of the
changes in section four dealt with increases in the amount of the
exemptions.3" Only one new exemption was adopted.33 ' This exemption only applies when the decedent is unmarried. If the decedent is unmarried, property transferred to his brother, sister, half
brother, or half sister is entitled to an exemption of ten thousand
dollars.
While the changes in section four deal mainly with changes in
the amount of exemptions, the changes in section eleven deal with
changes in the filing dates.n2 The time period for filing a return to
get a discount has been shortened from thirteen months to ten
months. Also, the time was shortened from fourteen months to
eleven months for computing when interest becomes due and when
a penalty is added.
The last change in the state and inheritance tax was the addition of § 11-11-28. This section imposes an additional tax on persons who die as residents of West Virginia. The tax is computed
by taking the maximum amount of the credit allowable under the
federal estate tax for estate, inheritance, legacy, and succession
taxes paid to the several states and deducting the amount of those
taxes actually paid to the states. The excess, if any, is the additional tax due. The purpose of this new section, as stated in
subparagraph (a) (2), is to ensure that the state gets the maximum
benefit of the credit allowed under the provisions of the federal
estate tax. Paragraph (b) of the new section provides for the apportionment of the additional tax in the same manner as the federal
estate tax is apportioned.33
The increases in the amount of exemptions were as follows:
(1) An increase from $100, or less, to $200, or less, exemption for
aggregate transfers.
(2) A widow's or widower's exemption was increased to $30,000
from $15,000.
(e) The exemption of a mother, father, child, or stepchild was increased from $5,000 to $10,000. The exemption of a grandchild was increased from $2,500 to $5,000.
Compare W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-11-4 (1974 Replacement Volume), with W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 11-11-4 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
"' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-11-4(e) (Cum. Supp. 1976) sets forth the new exemption.
32 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-11-11 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-11-28 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
This apportionment is to be done in accordance with W. VA. CODE ANN. §
44-2-16(a) (1966), which provides that the apportionment is made on the value of
each person's interest.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1977

71

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 3 [1977], Art. 8

TORTS

I. DANGEROUS AGENCIES-DUTY OF CARE
Gault v. Monongahela Power Co."' was a personal injury suit
by a husband and wife seeking recovery of damages for injuries
sustained by the husband when he walked into a low-slung, uninsulated, high-voltage power line which was owned and maintained
by the defendant over plaintiffs property. Defendant's motion to
set aside the jury verdict for plaintiffs was granted, and an appeal
was taken. Because the trial court gave no reason for its decision
rejecting the jury verdict, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals found it necessary to review all aspects of the case.
Abundant West Virginia authority sets the standard of care
required of an electric company maintaining high-voltage wires as
a degree of care commensurate with the dangers reasonably forean agency as electricity, a high
seeable; 336 in handling so dangerous
3
degree of care is required.
The court went one step further in citing a Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision which mandated a duty of thorough
inspection of electrical wires at whatever intervals may be necessary to insure the safe conduct of business.33 Although the court
set no maximum time limit between inspections, it indicated that
lack of inspection for eight months could result in liability for
negligence. Since evidence showed the last close inspection in the
instant case to be approximately six years prior to the accident, the
court found the defendant's omission to inspect its property to be
negligence as a matter of law.
Defendant contended that the inclusion of a specific amount
of $200,000 in one of plaintiffs instructions to the jury was reversible error. The court disagreed, citing a recent decision in which
such exposition of the ad damnum clause was disapproved but
held expressly not to be reversible error.3 9
223 S.E.2d 421 (W. Va. 1976).
=' Lancaster v. Potomac Edison Co., 192 S.E.2d 234 (W. Va. 1972); Sutton v.
Monongahela Power Co., 151 W. Va. 961, 158 S.E.2d 98 (1967); Johnson v. Monongahela Power Co., 146 W. Va. 900, 123 S.E.2d 81 (1961); Maggard v. Appalachian
Power Co., 111 W. Va. 470, 163 S.E. 27 (1932).
" 223 S.E.2d at 425, citing Morrison v. Appalachian Power Co., 75 W. Va. 608,
84 S.E. 506 (1915).
m Dunagan v. Appalachian Power Co., 23 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1928).
31 Jordan v. Bero, 210 S.E.2d 618, 629 (W. Va. 1974).
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The defendant also objected to the admission of plaintiff's
testimony that, although he had retired and was receiving social
security payments, he planned to return to work when able. The
court relied on decisions from other states to uphold admission of
the testimony on two rationales: first, the plaintiff deserved compensation for loss of his selective right to work, 4 ' and second, a
declaration of plaintiffs state of mind was admissible to prove
intent. 4 '

I1. FUTURE MEDICAL EXPENSES
The central issue on appeal in Simmons v. City of Bluefield42
was whether or not the question of damages for future pain and
suffering and future medical expenses from plastic reconstructive
surgery .hould have been submitted to the jury at the trial level.
Answering in the affirmative, the court referred to previous holdings that upon proper proof, a party may recover the reasonable
cost of anticipated cosmetic plastic surgery. 43 Proper proof is evidence that demonstrates with reasonable certainty that such future expenses will be incurred and that they are proximately related to the negligence of the defendant.3 44 Although the expert
testimony at the trial was conflicting as to cost and necessity, the
court felt that the evidence was adequate to permit the jury to
consider an award for future medical expenses and pain and suffering. The case was remanded for a new trial on the single issue of
damages.
Certainly, the better practice would be to withhold any monetary
figure from the jury's consideration which might be suggestive of amount
of damage not proven in evidence. However, recognizing the proper function of the jury and, also, that damage awards in personal injury actions
are necessarily somewhat indeterminate in character and amount, this
Court, while not approving exposition of ad damnum clauses to the jury,
does not reverse a case for this impropriety alone.
3,1 223 S.E.2d at 427.
3" Id., citing Blackburn v. Aetna Freight Lines, Inc., 368 F.2d 345 (3rd Cir.
1966).
342 225 S.E.2d 202 (W. Va. 1976). The Simmons case is also discussed in the
section entitled LOCAL GOVERNMENT.
3
Long v. City of Weirton, 214 S.E.2d 832 (W. Va. 1975); Hall v. Groves, 151
W. Va. 449, 153 S.E.2d 165 (1967).
"1 225 S.E.2d at 208, citing Jordan v. Bero, 210 S.E.2d 618 (W. Va. 1974);
Shreve v. Faris, 144 W. Va. 819, 111 S.E.2d 169 (1959); Carrico v. West Virginia
Cent. & P. Ry. Co., 39 W. Va. 86, 19 S.E. 571 (1894).
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In Ellard v. Harvey,345 plaintiffs appealed a circuit court judgment in their favor on the grounds that damages awarded for their
personal injuries were inadequate, and the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals set aside the verdict. The plaintiffs asserted not
merely that the amounts awarded were lower than their injuries
warranted, but that the low amounts were the result of adverse
rulings and instructions to the jury which deprived the claimants
of all the elements of damages to which they were entitled.
The first assignment of error raised the issue of the requisite
degree of certainty of future medical expenses to allow such evidence to go to the jury. In this jurisdiction, the rule has long been
established that "reasonable certainty" of future consequences of
the injury is the standard. "Contingent or merely possible future
injurious effects are too remote and speculative to support a lawful
recovery."34
In Simmons v. City of Bluefield, the court held that refusal
of a trial court to permit the question of future medical expenses
to go to the jury was error, when the "reasonably certain" standard
was met and the future expenses were proximately related to the
negligence of the defendant." 7 In Simmons, positive expert testimony established the relationship between the condition of the
plaintiff and the negligence of the defendant as well as the necessity for future medical care to the requisite degree of certainty.
Simmons also established an exception, used in the instant case,
to the general rule that a new trial, when granted, is awarded for
the entire case: a new trial may be limited to the single issue of
damages where liability is established. 48
A second ground for reversing the judgment below was the
failure of the jury to compensate for loss of consortium where such
loss and its relationship to defendant's negligence had been clearly
shown by testimony of the plaintiffs and their doctor. If a verdict
does not include compensation for all elements of damages which
are uncontroverted by the evidence, it should be set aside as inadequate. " ' The court found this failure of the jury to be a fatal flaw,
requiring reversal.
231 S.E.2d 339 (W. Va. 1976).
Jordan v. Bero, 210 S.E.2d 618, 629 (W. Va. 1974).
347225 S.E.2d 202, 208 (W. Va. 1976).
31 Id. at 209.
"I Biddle v. Haddix, 154 W. Va. 748, 179 S.E.2d 215 (1971).
"'
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Another error was defendant's instruction to the jury that the
evidence was insufficient to permit recovery for loss of wages. The
evidence was undisputed that his injuries caused the plaintiff to
lose several weeks of work and that he was paid his regular salary
as he used his accumulated sick leave. Therefore, the issue on this
assignment of error was the West Virginia stance on the "collateral
source" doctrine. This doctrine, accepted in most jurisdictions,
allows one to recover damages for lost wages even though he was
paid in accordance with a sick leave policy or similar plan while
away from work. The rationale, as stated by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, is that the victim should not lose any benefits
of his employment, wages or accumulated sick leave, due to the act
of a negligent third party. 5 Since the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals has recognized and adopted the collateral source
doctrine in another context,"' the court deemed it appropriate to
apply the rule in this case. Therefore, failure of the trial court to
allow plaintiff to instruct the jury concerning the allowance of loss
of wages was deemed reversible error.
Justices Neely and Wilson joined in a concurring opinion
which disagreed with the majority's approval of the traditional rule
that a plaintiff's recovery for future medical costs depends on his
showing a reasonable certainty that they will occur. They advocated adoption of a rule proposed by Justice Neely which states
that a plaintiff may be awarded damages for future medical expenses in proportion to the likelihood of their occurring.31
r4 Tallant Transfer Co. v. Bingham, 216 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1954).
3' In Jones v. Laird Foundation, Inc., 195 S.E.2d 821 (W.Va. 1973), the court
stated that workmen's compensation is a collateral source of benefits and is not a
proper consideration in mitigation of damages in an action against a third-party
tortfeasor.
21 The rule proposed by Justice Neely is described in detail in Jordan v. Bero,
210 S.E.2d 618, 640-41 (W. Va. 1974). Justice Neely points out the vague language
of the "reasonable certainty" rule and the problem of its application in certain cases
such as brain injuries where the ultimate results are difficult to predict. He suggests
approaching the problem as though the possibility of future medical expenses were
a separate injury, as large or as small as is the likelihood that they will occur, and
money damages should compensate the victim for that injury. The example furnished in Jordan is that a plaintiff who can prove a twenty per cent probability that
he will suffer future injuries costing a hundred thousand dollais should be awarded
twenty thousand dollars. In keeping with the traditional rule, the probability of
future injury, however large or small, must be proved to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty. The rule proposed by Justice Neely recognizes that probabilities
less than "reasonable certainty" or less than fifty per cent do exist and damages
for them could be awarded without becoming speculative.
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INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR

Sanders v. Georgia-PacificCorp.,353 was a personal injury action by a workman injured while loading logs on land belonging to
defendant lumber company in coordination with defendant's alleged independent contractor. A jury verdict against both the lumber company and the contractor was set aside by the circuit court
and the plaintiff appealed. The court had to determine "whether,
under the evidence, the trial court would have been justified in
taking the case from the jury as to Georgia-Pacific's defenses of
'
independent contractor and no primary negligence."354
Sanders' injury was caused by the negligent placing and/or
operation of a crane owned by defendant Georgia-Pacific but
placed and operated by defendant Rupert Sturgill, the lumber
company's alleged independent contractor. Once the plaintiff
made a prima facie showing of an employer-employee relationship
between Sturgill and the defendant, the burden of proving the
independent contractor status was on Georgia-Pacific."' Usually,
no single item decides the independent contractor issue, but the
general test is whether the one claiming the existence of the relationship either controls or has the right to control the work."' Although evidence was sharply in conflict, the court held that it was
sufficient for the jury to find no such relationship. Therefore, any
negligence on the part of Sturgill could be imputed to GeorgiaPacific vicariously.
The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to support
a jury finding of the direct negligence of Georgia-Pacific. Since the
company owned the premises, it owed to an invitee-workman the
duty of providing a safe place to work and the duty of exercising
ordinary care for his safety.35 There was evidence from which the
jury could have found that Georgia-Pacific knew or should have
known of the placement of the crane, and in allowing the negligent
placement, failed the continuing duty of care owed to an invitee.
The fact that work conditions may constantly change does not

'

225 S.E.2d 218 (W. Va. 1976).
Id. at 220.

Kirkhart v. United Fuel Gas Co., 86 W. Va. 79, 102 S.E. 806 (1920).
225 S.E.2d at 222.

See Hall v. Nello Teer Co., 203 S.E.2d 145 (W. Va. 1974); Ferguson v. R.
E. Ball & Co., 153 W. Va. 882, 173 S.E.2d 83 (1970); Roberts v. Kelly Axe & Tool
Co., 107 W. Va. 236, 148 S. E. 70 (1929).
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affect the affirmative duty to provide a safe place to work and to
exercise ordinary care. The court specifically disapproved syllabus
358
point two in Chenoweth v. Settle Engineers,
relied upon by defendant as establishing a less stringent duty to supply a safe place
to work. Chenoweth enunciated a general exception to that
duty-where the conditions of the place or work are constantly
changing. The Sanders court limited the exception to the "rare and
unusual instances where it can be shown that the one asserting the
defense of independent contractor neither knew nor in the exercise
of reasonable care, skill and diligence should have known of such
changing conditions."3"9 Since the trial court clearly acted under
36
some "legal misapprehension,""
the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with instructions to enter
judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
IV.

LIBEL

The two main issues in Neal v. Huntington PublishingCo.3"'
were: (1) what elements constitute a cause of action in libel for a
public official, and (2) may extrinsic evidence be used to identify
the one defamed. The alleged libel of plaintiff occurred in the
November 3, 1972, edition of the Huntington Herald-Dispatch,
published by defendant, and identifying the plaintiff only as
'
"THE SHERIFF."362
At the time of publication the plaintiff was
Sheriff of Cabell County and the Republican nominee for the
United States House of Representatives from the Fourth Congressional District of West Virginia. In his complaint he alleged that
the words were false, that they damaged his reputation in the
community and humiliated him, that they were "recklessly, dishonestly, and maliciously published and circulated" and that they
- 151 W. Va. 830, 156 S.E.2d 297 (1967). Syllabus point 2 states:
The rule that an employer or an independent contractor has a duty to
provide a safe place in which to work on the premises of such employer
is subject to an exception where the conditions of the place of work are
constantly changing.
Id. at 830.
21 225 S.E.2d at 222.
uo Id. at 223.
" 223 S.E.2d 792 (W. Va. 1976).
m "WHY HASN'T THE SHERIFF DENIED ANY OF THE 21 FELONY
CHARGES AGAINST HIM?? Is he afraid to stand trial? Is he relying on 'Political
Maneuvering' to get him off? Should he be treated different from anyone else
charged with a crime?" 223 S.E.2d at 794.
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were published with6 3the intent of injuring him in his good charac3
ter and reputation.
The court relied on the elements required in Sprouse v. Clay
Communications,Inc. to prove libel of a candidate for public office
or of a public official: 1) the alleged libelous statements were false
or misleading; 2) the statements tended to defame the plaintiff and
reflect shame, contumely, and disgrace upon him; 3) the statements were published with knowledge at the time of publication
that they were false or misleading or were published with a reckless
and willful disregard of truth; and, 4) the publisher intended to
injure the plaintiff through the knowing or reckless publication of
the alleged libelous material.'" The plaintiff's complaint fulfilled
these requirements and therefore constituted a valid cause of action in libel. The Sprouse "actual malice" requirement to prove
libel of a public official was recently reaffirmed by the United
States Supreme Court." 5
The defendant publisher asserted that nothing in the publication identified the plaintiff as the person about whom the defamatory words were used, and relied on Argabright v. Jones"' for the
proposition that extrinsic evidence may not be used to identify one
who has been defamed. Plaintiff relied on the same case, in partic' to support the theory that
ular, the words "or ascertainable"367
extrinsic evidence may be used to identify one libelled, in which
case any reader of the newspaper could easily discover that "THE
SHERIFF" was Mr. Neal. Agreeing with the plaintiff's position,
the Court reversed the circuit court's dismissal and remanded the
case for further proceedings.
V.

PARENTAL IMMUNITY

The doctrine of parental immunity was limited in West Virginia in the case of Lee v. Comer.3"' In Lee, the court held that this
common law doctrine is no longer applicable in cases where a child
I" Id. at 795.
31,
211 S.E.2d 674, 679 (W. Va. 1975).
- Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
3,46 W. Va. 144, 32 S.E. 995 (1899).
46 W. Va. at 146, 32 S.E. at 996, citing 13 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law 391: "The
defamatory words must refer to some ascertained or ascertainable person, and that
person must be the plaintiff."
3" 224 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1976).
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is injured in an automobile accident as a result of his parent's
negligence.
The historical justification for the creation of the doctrine of
parental immunity was the preservation of family relations and
domestic tranquillity."' However, it is highly unlikely that a suit
by a minor child against a parent will disrupt family peace where
the parent is protected by liability insurance. The court recognized
that the basis for the doctrine has largely disappeared due to the
prevalence of auto insurance; this is the reason the court advanced
for limiting abrogation of the doctrine to cases of automobile acci370
dents.
Cases from fifteen jurisdictions were cited which now permit
suits under these circumstances as evidence of the "landslide
trend" toward abandonment of the doctrine."' The rationale is
that where insurance exists, an action against the parent will actually benefit the family relationship instead of disrupting it, and
where no insurance is carried, the child probably will not sue. If
the child does sue the parent, knowing there is no liability coverage, it is doubtful whether there was any family tranquillity for the
courts to preserve. Furthermore, a personal injury action will cause
no more bitterness than a property or contract action by a child
against his parent, and the latter two actions have traditionally
3 2
been permitted.

Having disposed of the domestic relations argument, the court
turned to the defendant's objection that allowing such suits would
encourage collusion between children and parents to obtain undeserved compensation from insurance companies. Two theories were
held applicable in rejecting this contention: first, upon balancing,
the right of the child to be free from personal injury outweighs the
danger of possible collusion. Second, one of the functions of our
juries and trial courts is to sift out the fraudulent claims from the
honest ones. 3
Therefore, the parental immunity doctrine is no longer applicable in West Virginia when a parent's negligent driving causes
Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
'7

224 S.E.2d at 723.

'

Id. at 723-24.

'

Sorensen v. Sorensen, 339 N.E.2d 907 (Mass. 1975).
224 S.E.2d at 724-25.
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injury to his child. Cases inconsistent with this position were over-

ruled. 74

In concurrence, Justice Neely argued that the court's limitation of the doctrine should be couched in terms of whether or not
the parent is insured, instead of whether or not the accident occurred in an automobile. Eliminating parental immunity "where
the real party in interest is an insurance carrier rather than a
parent" is consistent with the majority's reasoning, he argued.37
VI.

SAFE PLACE TO WORK-STANDARD OF CARE

Bates v. Sirk3T 6 was a personal injury action by a race track
employee against his employer for negligently failing to provide a
safe place to work. Plaintiff was struck by an out-of-control race
car as he was performing his duties in the infield of the track. Since
defendant-employer was eligible to subscribe to the workmen's
compensation fund but did not do so, he lost his common-law
defenses of the fellow-servant rule, assumption of risk, and contri377
butory negligence.
However, plaintiff still had the burden of making a prima
facie showing of negligence on the part of defendant. This was
accomplished by plaintiff's evidence of no guard rail, no protective
pit, inadequate lighting, no warning system, and an inadequate
number of employees. The defendant's defense was that he employed the same safety standards as other tracks in the area, and
this custom and usage in the business established a standard of
care beyond which he need not go. Rejecting this argument, the
court defined the standard as reasonable prudence rather than
what is usual and ordinary. "What usually is done may be evidence
of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a
standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied
with or not." '78 The employer here failed to meet the requisite
standard and so was held liable.
3
Specifically overruled: Chase v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 195 S.E.2d 810 (W.
Va. 1973); Adams v. Grogg, 153 W. Va. 55, 166 S.E.2d 755 (1969); Freeland v.
Freeland, 152 W. Va. 332, 162 S.E.2d 922 (1968); Securo v. Securo, 110 W. Va. 1,
156 S.E. 750 (1931).
15 224 S.E.2d at 725-26.
-6 230 S.E.2d 738 (W. Va. 1976).
' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-2-8 (1977 Replacement Volume).
230 S.E.2d at 741, quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470
(1903).
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I.

SECOND INJURY-SURPLUS FUND

In Muliens v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,37 an employee of a self-insured employer was granted a
life award pursuant to the second injury provision 0 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. The employee's permanent total
disability rating was the cumulative result of previous injuries
and of the work-related second injury to his back. Although the
employer was a self-insurer of first injuries, it had elected to pay
into the Compensation Act's surplus fund. 8' In accordance with
the provisions of the Act, the employer was required to make payments to the employee only of those benefits relating to the first
injury; the remainder of the payments were to be made from the
second injury reserve of the surplus fund.32 When payment of the
cash benefits for the excess of the life award over the award for the
permanent partial disability caused by the second injury began
from the surplus fund, the employer protested his payment of any
of the employee's further medical expenses. The commissioner determined that the self-insured employer was responsible for the
payment of the injured employee's continuing*medical expenses
regardless of its participation in the surplus fund. The appeal
board ruled that the continuing medical expenses caused by the
second injury should be paid by the commissioner from the surplus
fund, and that the commissioner had no statutory authority to
compel a self-insurer to pay medical bills in excess of $3,000 in a
case involving a life award due to a second injury. On appeal by
the commissioner, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
agreed with both rulings of the appeal board, holding that "when
an employee of a self-insured employer who pays into the surplus
fund sustains a second injury, the employer is liable for medical
expenses up to $3,000, and that thereafter the surplus fund is
chargeable for such medical payments." '
" 223 S.E.2d 604 (W. Va. 1976).

The surplus fund of the West Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act
"cover[s] the catastrophe hazard, the second injury hazard, and all losses not
otherwise specifically provided for in this chapter." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-3-1
(1973 Replacement Volume).
IM W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-2-9, as amended (Cum. Supp. 1976).
3.2 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-3-1 (1973 Replacement Volume); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 23-2-9, as amended (Cum. Supp. 1976).
3.1 223 S.E.2d at 605.
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The court initially distinguished its decision in Smith v. State
384 noting that Smith
Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,
involved a first injury to the employee of a self-insurer. The court
then examined the portion of the self-insured employer statute
relating to second injuries.385 Significant to its decision that selfinsured employers who pay into the surplus fund should have the
benefits of the surplus fund in the payment of medical expenses
was the inclusion of the word "expenses" in the self-insured employer statute. The court reasoned that for the term to have any
efficacy within the scheme of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
the only reasonable interpretation of the self-insurer provision was
that the inclusion of the word "expenses" in the portion relating
to second injuries contemplated medical expenses. 8 The court was
further persuaded by the fact that self-insured employers paying
into the surplus fund pay upon the same basis and in the same
percentages as regular subscribers.8 The court noted that because
the self-insurer who elects to pay into the surplus fund is charged
at the same rate as a regular subscriber, he is also entitled to have
the compensation and expenses caused by a second injury paid
from the surplus fund to the same extent as a regular subscriber.8 8
Having found that all participants in the surplus fund were entitled to the same benefits, the court concluded that "[o]ne of those
benefits is exoneration from further charges above and beyond the
permanent partial disability attributable to a second injury when
a combination of injuries warrants a life award."3 " '
Having held in Mullens that the liability of a Self-insured
employer who pays into the surplus fund for payment of medical
expenses upon a second injury to an employee resulting in a life
award was limited to the $3,000 maximum medical disbursement
then provided for by the Act,"' the question remains how the holding in Mullens will apply following the 1976 amendment to the
medical payment provision.39' It should be noted that the decision
1"219 S.E.2d 361 (W. Va. 1975). Smith held that a self-insured employer who
contributed to the surplus fund was required to pay all medical expenses of a first
injury to an employee without benefit of the surplus fund.
- W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-2-9, as amended (Cum. Supp. 1976).
m 223 S.E.2d at 606.
- W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-3-1 (1973 Replacement Volume).
1" 223 S.E.2d at 607.

u' Id.
310 W. VA. CoDE ANN.
3" W. VA. CODE ANN.

§ 23-4-3(a) (1973 Replacement Volume).
§ 23-4-3(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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does not discuss the court's affirmation of the appeal board's ruling
that the commissioner was not statutorily authorized to direct a
self-insurer to pay medical expenses in excess of $3,000 attendant
upon a second injury. However, the court's specific holding39
would seem to indicate that the maximum medical disbursement
figure contained in the Act marked the point at which the selfinsurer who contributed to the surplus fund was entitled to rely on
the surplus fund for payment of any medical expenses of a second
injury. If the commissioner's authority to direct the self-insurer to
make such medical payments was limited only by the maximum
figure contained in the medical payment provision of the Act, it
seems possible that the recent amendment to the statute, which
limits the commissioner's ability to make medical disbursements
from the compensation fund only to what "may be reasonably
'
required,"393
would permit the commissioner to direct a selfinsured employer to make payment of medical bills to an indeterminate amount, even in the case of a second injury.
A more reasonable interpretation of Mullens is suggested by
reading the decision in its entirety and interpreting the result in
light of the court's reasoning and the purpose of the second injury
fund. The recognized purpose of second injury funds is to supplement the regular compensation system with a plan whereby workers who sustain work-related second injuries will receive compensation benefits commensurate with their degree of disability, and
which will not reduce the opportunities of these workers to obtain
employment. 94 An interpretation of Mullens that would allow the
commissioner to continue to direct an employer to make payments
of medical expenses indefinitely would be at odds with that purpose. Additionally, because the statutory limit of $3,000 for medical disbursements has been removed, use of the $3,000 figure to
denote the point at which self-insured employers are entitled to the
benefits of the second injury reserve of the surplus fund upon a
second injury to an employee has no present justification. A reasonable interpretation which would allow consistent application
would be that Mullens limits the liability of the self-insured employer to make payments for medical expenses of a second injury
which results in a life award to the period during which the em392See text accompanying note 5 supra.

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-3(a) (Cum.Supp. 1976).
"I See 2 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 59.30 (desk ed. 1972).

3"
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ployer is responsible for the payment of cash benefits for the permanent partial disability caused by the second injury. 95
II.

COMPENSATION FOR OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES

The compensation formula of the West Virginia Workmen's
Compensation Act requires that employees receive "personal injuries in the course of and resulting from their covered employment" 9 before they are entitled to any benefits under the Act.
Although not expressly included in the language of the Act, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has for many years construed the first element of the formula-that the employee have
received "personal injuries"-to require proof that the injury was
caused by an accident."' To prove a compensable injury by accident, claimants must show that the disability was attributable to
a "definite, isolated, fortuitous occurrence."3 " ' In the typical industrial accident, the definite, isolated, fortuitous event which
demonstrates injury by accident is not normally a difficult matter
of proof. However, when the injury follows as the consequence of
the employee's usual and ordinary duties of employment, or where
the injury is superimposed on a preexisting like injury, claimants
have encountered difficulties in meeting the standard of recovery
established by the court.
In one such case, Pennington v. State Workmen's Compensa399
tion Commissioner,
the claimant, whose duties included patrolling a coal conveyor belt line and cleaning up the spillage of coal,
alleged a back injury resulting from shoveling a load of coal onto
a conveyor belt. The employer contended that the back ailment
occurred while the claimant was engaged in the ordinary duties of
his employment and, therefore, did not constitute a personal injury
by accident as contemplated by the Workmen's Compensation
35 Presumably, the same result would obtain in the case of a regular subscriber. Because both regular subscribers and self-insured employers are to share in the
benefits of the surplus fund to the same extent, and because the 1976 amendment
has removed any maximum limit to which a regular subscriber may be charged with
medical disbursements, it would seem that the regular subscriber should be charged
for the medical expenses of a second injury only until the payment of cash benefits
is taken over by the surplus fund.
3" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-1 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
:, E.g., Archibald v. Compensation Comm'r, 77 W. Va. 448, 87 S.E. 791 (1916).
:" See, e.g., Jordan v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 191 S.E.2d
497 (W. Va. 1972).
321 222 S.E.2d 579 (W. Va. 1976).
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Act. The court, however, ruled that the act of shoveling coal during
which the claimant suffered a sudden pain was a definite, isolated,
fortuitous event, and that the evidence of the occurrence of the
injury satisfied the requirements of a personal injury within the
meaning of the Act."' The court restated the proposition that West
Virginia requires proof of injury by accident,4 0' but chose to adopt
a more liberal construction of the term accident, noting that "when
considering compensability under the compensation law an accident need not be a visible happening; it may be an unusual or
unexpected result attending the operation or performance of a
usual or necessary event or act."40 2
The court in Penningtonappears to have adopted the position
that the personal injury by accident requirement may be satisfied
by demonstrating that the performance of a usual or ordinary duty
of the employment produced an unexpected result. However, it
should be noted that Penningtoninvolved a back injury to a claimant with no prior history of back trouble. The court gave no indication of whether a showing of an unexpected result from the usual
duties of employment would satisfy the requirements of the Act
where the injury was to a claimant with a preexisting like injury."'
Closely akin to the problem in Pennington, the court was
faced, in Lilly v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,04
with the question of the compensability of a gradual back injury.
The claimant, who had been in the employ of a garment manufacturer for six months prior to her disability claim, alleged back
injuries resulting from the duties of her employment. Her job normally required a lifting and twisting motion with bundles of pants
weighing up to twenty-five pounds per bundle up to ten times per
hour. The claimant could point to no sudden cause or result to
satisfy the requirement of an injury by accident attributable to a
definite, isolated, fortuitous occurrence. In fact, claimant's testimony clearly indicated that the injury was the gradually developed
result of the performance of her usual duties over a protracted
period of time. The claim was pursued on the theory that the
"I Id. at 581.

40,
Id.
402Id.
403 For a general discussion of the "by accident" requirement, and the
accidental-cause versus accidental-result problem, see 1 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION § 37.00 (desk ed. 1972).
40225 S.E.2d 214 (W. Va. 1976).
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claimant's injury was an "occupational disease" ' 5 and, therefore,
compensable as a personal injury under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The court reasoned that a gradually developing bodily
impairment satisfied the general definition of a disease."' Guided
by decisions from other jurisdictions which had determined a back
injury to be an occupational disease within the contemplation of
compensation law,40 ' the court ruled that, based on the evidence
presented, the claimant's gradually received back injury was compensable as an "occupational disease" incurred in the course of
and resulting from her employment within the meaning of the
Workmen's Compensation Act."'

III.

EMPLOYEE IMMUNITY

In Eisnaugle v. Booth,"' an employee sued a co-employee for
personal injuries received on the way to work from being struck in
the employer's parking lot by an automobile driven by the coemployee. The co-employee moved for summary judgment, contending that he was immune from personal liability under the
Workmen's Compensation Act's employee immunity provision ' ,
"because [the employee's] injuries were received in the zone of his
employment and were compensable under the State Workmen's
Compensation laws." '' The plaintiff, however, alleged that the
defendant was intoxicated at the time of the accident, and that he
. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-1 (Cum. Supp. 1976) provides that "the terms
'injury' and 'personal injury' shall include occupational pneumoconiosis and any
other occupational disease, as hereinafter defined . .. .
404225 S.E.2d at 217.

Id.
4- In order for a disease to be considered an "occupational disease" within the
scope of the Workmen's Compensation Act, it is necessary that such disease have
occurred in the course of and resulting from the employment. In cases of diseases
which are "ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed outside
of the employment," the disease, to be deemed to have arisen in the course of and
resulting from the employment, must meet six criteria as set forth in the Act. W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-1 (Cum. Supp. 1976). The court in Lilly recognized the
necessity of the claimant's injury fulfilling these criteria but offered no analysis of
how the individual criteria applied or were met in this case.
' 226 S.E.2d 259 (W. Va. 1976).
,' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-2-6a (1973 Replacement Volume) provides that:
The immunity from liability set out in the preceeding section [§23-2-6]
shall extend to every officer, manager, agent, representative or employee
of such employer when he is acting in furtherance of the employer's
business and does not inflict an injury with deliberate intention.
"1 226 S.E.2d at 260.
40
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was, therefore, not immune from civil liability for the personal
injuries sustained by the plaintiff. The trial court granted defendant's motion. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court, using the findings that the
injured employee's injuries were received in the course of and as a
result of his employment," ' that several cases which involved similar factual circumstances to those in the instant case had all held
the co-employee to be immune from a civil action," 3 and that the
plaintiff had failed to assert that the injury was inflicted with the
deliberate intention which could except the co-employee from the
immunity provision. "
Exactly how the court concluded from these findings that the
employee immunity provision precluded the plaintiff from maintaining a common law action for damages against the co-employee
is not clear. The employee immunity statute of the Act extends
immunity from liability "to every . . . employee . . when he is
acting in furtherance of the employer's business."4 5' Unfortunately,
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals made no reference to
this language.
Language similar in substance to the "acting in furtherance
of the employer's business" language of the West Virginia em"I2Id. at 260-61. The general rule is that injuries sustained by employees while
going to or coming from work are not received within the course of and resulting
from the employment, except where the injuries are sustained on the employer's
premises at a point reasonably proximate to the place of work. Hager v. State
Compensation Comm'r., 112 W. Va. 492, 165 S.E. 668 (1932).
" 226 S.E.2d at 261. Brown v. Reed, 209 Va. 592, 165 S.E.2d 394 (1969)
(employee injured by co-employee in employer's parking lot); Jackson v. Hutchinson, 453 S.W.2d 269 (Ky. 1970) (same); Threet v. Pinkston, 20 Mich. App. 39, 173
N.W.2d 731 (1970) (same); Bennett v. Buckner, 150 W. Va. 648, 149 S.E.2d 201
(1966) (employee injured while riding in co-employee's truck over employer's private road on the way to a work site).
"1 226 S.E.2d at 261. Additionally, the court noted that even were they to
assume that the defendant was intoxicated and that the intoxication was responsible for his conduct, the necessary deliberate intention would still be lacking, as
"[n]either gross negligence nor wanton misconduct are such as to constitute injury
by deliberate intention as contemplated by the immunizing statute." Id. In his
concurring opinion, Justice Wilson expressed his disapproval of the court's restrictive interpretation of the deliberate intention requirement. Id. at 261-62. The difficulties that the court has experienced in attempting to define "deliberate intention" as it relates to the Workmen's Compensation Act are examined in 72 W. VA.
L. REv. 90 (1970).
"' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-2-6a (1973 Replacement Volume).
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ployee immunity statute is found in the immunity statutes of other
jurisdictions. Although such phraseology has generally been held
to mean that the immunity attaches only when the co-employee
who caused the injury is acting in the scope of his employment,
there has been disagreement as to what "scope of the employment"
test to apply. 18 Some jurisdictions interpret it to mean that the coemployee must have been in the "scope of the employment" in the
common law, respondeat superior sense of that phrase." 7 Under
this interpretation, immunity is conditioned upon a finding that
the co-employee was actually pursuing some interest of the employer at the time of the accident. Others interpret such qualifying
language to mean that the co-employee must have been acting in
the "scope of the employment" in the workmen's compensation
sense for the immunity to attach."' This interpretation uses the
same test that is used to determine whether the injured employee's
injuries are compensable. In the context of Eisnaugle, it seems that
either interpretation would provide an argument in favor of allowing the injured employee's third party claim.
It is certainly arguable that a respondeat superiorinterpretation of the phrase "acting in furtherance of the employer's business" is intended by the West Virginia Act. The language used in
the immunity provision, in addition to closely approximating the
common law definition of "scope of the employment," differs substantially from the "in the course of and resulting from"419 language used in the Compensation Act to define sufficient work
connection. However, if such an interpretation was applied by the
court in Eisnaugle, it seems inconceivable that the defendant
could have been brought within the statute's immunity. He had
not yet reported to work when the accident occurred and could not
have been considered as actively engaging in his employer's service
at the time of the accident. In order to bring the defendant's conduct within the purview of the immunity provision of the Act, it
must be assumed that the court interpreted "acting in furtherance
of the employer's business" to require application of the workmen's
compensation "scope of the employment" test. The cases cited by
the Eisnaugle court completely support this proposition.2
§ 72.20 (desk ed. 1972).
See, e.g., Saala v. McFarland, 63 Cal. 2d 124, 45 Cal. Rptr. 144, 403 P.2d
400 (1965).
,iSee, e.g., Konitch v. Hartung, 81 N.J. Super, 376, 195 A.2d 649 (1963).
"'
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-1 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
,' See 2 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
"7

'2 See note 5 supra.
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The plaintiff in Eisnaugle alleged that the defendant's intoxication should nullify the Act's employee immunity. Support for
this contention can be found in the provision of the Workmen's
Compensation Act relating to employee misconduct. 2 ' That provision excludes from the benefits of the fund any employee whose
injuries are caused by "the intoxication of such employee.14

2

It

seems unreasonable to suggest that the Act, read as a whole, would
penalize the intoxicated employee in one instance by denying him
the benefits of the fund upon an injury to himself, and would, at
the same time, provide immunity when he injures an innocent coemployee.
IV.

PETITIONS FOR REOPENING PNEUMOCONIOSIS CASES

In Hamrick v. State Workmen's Compensation
Commissioner,4 23 claimant, who had previously been granted a
twenty-five percent permanent partial disability award for occupational pneumoconiosis, filed a petition with the commissioner to
reopen his claim asserting progression of his condition. The commissioner held that the claimant had been fully compensated by
the prior award and denied the petition for a reopening. The claimant appealed the commissioner's final order, asserting that the
case should have been referred to the occupational pneumoconiosis
board for advice on the matter of progression before the entry of a
final order. The appeal board agreed, reversing the commissioner's
order and remanding the claim for referral to the occupational
pneumoconiosis board. The claimant's employer appealed the decision of the appeal board, and the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals reversed.
The court's decision was based on the ground that the appeal
board had made an erroneous conclusion of law relating to the
commissioner's statutory duty when considering petitions for reopening in occupational pneumoconiosis cases. 24 The claimant
had asserted that the provision of the Workmen's Compensation
Act requiring that the occupational pneumoconiosis board's find" W. VA. CODE ANN.
422 Id.

§ 23-4-2 (1973

Replacement Volume).

228 S.E.2d 702 (W. Va. 1976).
"Our review of this case concerns the legal conclusions of the appeal board
rather than the findings of fact and we find those legal conclusions to be erroneous."
Id. at 704.
"=
"'
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ings set forth whether or not the claimant's exposure has
"perceptibly aggravated an existing occupational pneumoconiosis 5'4 made it mandatory for the occupational pneumoconiosis
board to determine whether the claimant's condition had been
aggravated.26 The court, however, found that the commissioner
was under no statutory duty to refer a petition for reopening of an
occupational pneumoconiosis claim to the occupational pneumoconiosis board but, rather, that the decision of whether or not to
refer a reopening claim to the board was expressly placed within
the commissioner's discretion by the statute.'2 Although recognizing that referral to the occupational pneumoconiosis board may
sometimes be helpful, the court held that the appeal board's determination that referral was mandated by the Act was erroneous.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-8c(c)(2) (1973 Replacement Volume).
"26
228 S.E.2d at 703.
'2' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-8 (Cum.Supp. 1976) provides in pertinent part
that: "If the compensation claimed is for occupational pneumoconiosis, the commissoner shall have the power, . . . whenever in his opinion it shall be necessary,
to order a claimant to appear for examination before the occupational pneumocon'2

iosis board ......
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